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UNION NEUTRALITY LAW OR EMPLOYER GAG LAW? 
EXPLORING NLRA PREEMPTION OF NEW YORK LABOR LAW 
SECTION 211-A 
 
Debra Charish* 
INTRODUCTION 
Union membership has declined sharply during the past several 
decades.1 Organized labor is presently seeking out new and unique 
ways to rebuild labor’s numbers.2 One specific method organized 
labor has discovered to reinforce its ranks is to press state 
legislatures for so-called “union neutrality” laws that appear to 
favor unions.3 One such law is New York State’s Labor Law 
Section 211-a.4 In 1996, the New York legislature enacted Section 
                                                          
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2007; B.A. in Industrial and Labor 
Relations, Cornell University, 2004. The author would like to thank her family 
and friends for their enduring love and support. She would also like to thank 
the various practioners for their assistance in answering her questions, 
as well as the staff and editors of the Journal of Law and Policy for 
their diligence and support. 
1 See Charles B. Craver, Rearranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: The 
Inadequacy of Modest Proposals to Reform Labor Law, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1616 
(May 1995) (noting that the union density rate has declined from a high of 35% 
in 1954). 
2 See David Moberg, Organize, Strategize, Revitalize; Unions Debate Best 
Way to Revive Labor’s Fortunes, IN THESE TIMES, Feb. 16, 2004, at 18. 
Proposals to revitalize unions include wide-scale organizing efforts, 
restructuring unions so that there exists a smaller number of unions that are 
focused on specific industries, and increasing internal union democracy. Id. 
3 See Healthcare Ass’n of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Pataki (HANYS), 388 F. Supp. 
2d 6, 9 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (“unions clearly view [New York’s “union neutrality” 
statute] as sending a pro-union message”). 
4 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 211-a (McKinney 1996) (amended 2002). 
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211-a, which prohibits employers from using state funds to 
discourage or encourage union organizing.5 With this law, labor 
unions sought to enhance their position against the employers 
through the law’s prohibition on state-supported employers’ use of 
state funds to affect union membership—thus, employers would be 
relegated to spending funds derived from profits or other sources 
not provided by the state.6 
While unions continue to push for the adoption of state union 
neutrality laws, they presently face a risk that a court may find 
such laws to be preempted by the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA).7 The Supreme Court has set forth two separate standards 
for NLRA preemption: Garmon preemption and Machinist 
preemption.8 The Garmon preemption prohibits states from 
regulating conduct that is arguably protected or prohibited by the 
NLRA.9 Alternatively, the Machinists preemption prevents state 
interference in areas that Congress intended to leave to the free 
play of economic forces.10 However, these strands of preemption 
are subject to various exceptions.11 If a court finds that the state is 
regulating matters covered by the NLRA under one of these two 
doctrines, and the regulation is not saved by the exceptions, the 
regulation is rendered invalid, often through the court’s dismissal 
of a lawsuit.12 
                                                          
5 Id. The statute was later amended in 2002 to incorporate record keeping 
and enforcement measures. See infra Part III.B. 
6 See infra Part III.A. 
7 See Jackson Lewis, Importance of Employer Speech at Heart of Second 
Blow to California’s Union Neutrality Legislation, (Sept. 14, 2005), 
http://www.jacksonlewis.com/legalupdates/articleprint.cfm?aid=846 (asserting 
that the Ninth Circuit’s second opinion in Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. 
Lockyer, which held that California’s union neutrality law was preempted by the 
NLRA, left little doubt that future state legislation seeking to impose employer 
neutrality during union organizing campaigns will fail). 
8 Stephen Befort & Brian Smith, At the Cutting Edge of Labor Law 
Preemption: A Critique of Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer, 20 LAB. LAW. 
107 (Summer 2004). 
9 Id. See infra Part II.B.1. 
10 Befort & Smith, supra note 8, at 107. See infra Part II.B.2. 
11 Befort & Smith, supra note 8, at 107. 
12 4-36 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT: LAW & PRACTICE § 36.01 
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This is precisely what occurred in the federal district court in 
the Northern District of New York on May 17, 2005. In 
Healthcare Association of New York State, Inc. v. Pataki,13 
(hereinafter HANYS) the plaintiffs (a coalition of organizations 
representing over 550 non-profit and public hospitals, nursing 
homes, and health care agencies) argued that Section 211-a is 
preempted by federal labor law, and is thus invalid.14 The court 
agreed with the plaintiffs. In finding Section 211-a preempted by 
federal labor law under the Machinist doctrine, Judge McCurn 
concluded that the statute hindered an employer’s ability to 
disseminate information to employees, which amounted to a direct 
interference with the union organizing process recognized by 
federal labor law.15 The case is currently being appealed in the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.16 
This Note argues that New York Labor Law Section 211-a is 
fully preempted by the NLRA under principles governed by the 
Garmon preemption and the Machinist preemption, that no 
exceptions to preemption apply, and that the decision of the district 
court in HANYS should therefore be affirmed. Furthermore, should 
HANYS not be affirmed, the impact on employers’ rights of free 
speech would be irreparably chilled, which is not conducive to 
                                                          
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2005). 
13  388 F. Supp. 2d 6 (N.D.N.Y. 2005). 
14 See infra Part III.C. Several groups also moved to appear as amicus 
curiae, due to the vastly differing opinions between labor and management on 
the effects of Section 211-a on labor relations in the workplace. HANYS, 388 F. 
Supp. at 8. These groups were the Business Council, the Coalition, and the 
Brennan Center. Id. 
15 See infra Part III.C. 
16 Oral arguments were heard before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
on February 10, 2006, and the court’s decision is now pending. In addition to the 
appellants’ and appellees’ briefs submitted to the Court of Appeals, several 
groups submitted amicus curiae briefs. On behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees, 
amicus curiae briefs were submitted by the National Labor Relations Board, 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, New York State 
Association of Health Care Providers, Inc., et. al., and National Right to Work 
Legal Defense Foundation, Inc. On behalf of the defendants-appellants, amicus 
curiae briefs were submitted by the Brennan Center for Justice, et. al. and 
fourteen New York scholars on labor and employment law. 
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advancing the goals of the collective bargaining process. Part I 
briefly provides background information on union membership and 
the methods which the unions are engaging to reverse the declining 
membership trend. Part II explains the development of federal 
labor law’s preemption of state labor legislation through the 
Supreme Court’s development of case law addressing these issues. 
Part III describes the provisions contained in Section 211-a and 
Judge McCurn’s conclusion in HANYS that the federal labor law 
preempts the statute. Part IV examines arguments on how the 
Garmon and Machinist preemption standards, and their various 
exceptions, should be applied to Section 211-a, and concludes that 
federal labor law preempts the New York statute. Part V examines 
the policy implications and impact that an affirmation of the 
decision in HANYS will have in the sphere of labor management 
relations. 
I. THE EMERGENCE OF TACTICS TO BOLSTER UNION MEMBERSHIP 
Since the years following World War II, union membership as 
a percentage of the total workforce nationwide has been steadily 
diminishing.17 When the American Federation of Labor-Congress 
                                                          
17 Frederick D. Braid, Laws Muzzle Employers, NAT’L L. J. (May 24, 
2004), available at http://www.hklaw.com/content//whitepapers/ 
lawsmuzzle.pdf. The decline in union membership has been attributed to 
numerous economic and social factors. Stephen F. Befort, Labor and 
Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical 
Assessment, 43 B.C. L. Rev 351, 362 (March 2002). First, following WWII, 
U.S. employment experienced a shift away from manufacturing and mining and 
toward the service sector. See Press Release, Jeffrey Young, Voice of America, 
The Challenge Facing U.S. Labor Unions (Sept. 4, 2005), available at 
http://author.voanews.com/english/archive/2005-09/2005-08-02-voa17.cfm? 
renderforprint=1&textonly=1&&CFI=6536443&CFTOKEN=42953398. 
Whereas manufacturing and mining were typically union strongholds, the 
service sector has historically contained a lower percentage of unionized 
workers. Id. Second, the employment model has shifted from internal labor 
markets characterized by long-term employment relationships toward unstable 
employment relationships and an expanding contingent workforce. Befort, 
supra, at 366-67. As a result, organizing has become increasingly difficult 
because workers fail to see the benefits of union representation when their 
employment is short-term. Id. at 370-71. Third, advances in technology, 
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of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) was established in 1955, 
the unions represented more than one-third of private-sector 
employees.18 The most recent data on union membership reveals 
that in 2005, 12.5% of workers were union members, with a mere 
7.8% of private-sector employees belonging to a union.19 
While the unions uniformly desire to bolster membership, they 
have recently diverged in their approaches toward accomplishing 
this common goal.20 This divergence in outlook led two of the 
largest unions, the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) 
and the Teamsters, to withdraw from the AFL-CIO21 on July 25, 
2005, and form the Change to Win Coalition.22 The Change to Win 
                                                          
communication, and transportation have induced employers to engage in off-
shore production as a means of avoiding unions and simultaneously lowering 
labor costs. Id. at 363-64. See also Patrick Mirza, et al., Ten Changes That 
Rocked HR: It’s No Wonder HR is Expected to Help Manage Change. Look at 
What it Has Been Through, SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 
(Dec. 1, 2005), available at 2005 WLNR 22386727. Fourth, globalization has 
forced employers to cut costs in order to effectively compete in the new 
economy, resulting in employers more adamantly resisting unions’ wage 
demands or engaging in union avoidance. See Befort, supra, at 364. See also 
Mirza, supra. Fifth, commentators often note that the demographic identity of 
the workforce has become dramatically more diverse. ROBERT J. RABIN, ET AL., 
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 234, (2nd ed. 1995). Id. See also Befort supra, 
at 365 (providing the following demographic statistics: In 1950, the workforce 
was composed of 33.9% adult women. By 2000, this percentage increased to 
61.1%. Since 1950, the proportion of nonwhite employees has increased by 
greater than 50%.). Lastly, some commentators and unions blame the decline of 
unionization on unlawful employer coercion of employees during the union 
election process, or alternatively on lawful but aggressive employer 
campaigning. See infra Part V. 
18 See Michael J. Stief III & Marijane E. Treacy, Labor Unions Throw Out 
the Old Rulebook: The AFL-CIO’s Split Harbingers a New Era of Activism, 
With Fresh Challenges for Employers, 28 NAT’L L. J. 9 (Oct. 31, 2005). 
19 U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members in 2005 (Jan. 
20, 2006), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf. 
20 Voice of America, supra note 17. 
21 The AFL-CIO “is a voluntary federation of 52 national and international 
labor unions.” AFL-CIO, This is the AFL-CIO, 
http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/. 
22 America’s Labour Federation: Losing its Grip, ECONOMIST, July 30, 
2005, at 72, available at 2005 WLNR 11967175. 
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Coalition focuses on wide-scale organizing efforts at the workplace 
as a means of rectifying decreasing union membership.23 In 
contrast, the AFL-CIO focuses its efforts chiefly on politics, by 
providing monetary funds to support political candidates that it 
feels would be sympathetic towards labor, and by targeting specific 
state laws.24 
On the organizing front, one tactic that the unions have used 
over the past several years to reverse the decline in union 
membership is to shift their focus away from seeking secret ballot 
elections.25 Secret ballot elections are held by the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) upon the filing of a petition to determine 
whether a majority of the employees desire union representation.26 
Between the filing of the petition and the holding of the election, 
the union and the employer mount campaigns to inform employees 
of their views on unionization.27 Since these employer 
communications to employees during the campaigns frustrate 
unions’ organizing efforts, unions have targeted their efforts on 
obtaining card check agreements, particularly in those industries 
that cannot relocate, including municipalities, universities, and 
healthcare complexes such as hospitals and nursing homes.28 A 
                                                          
23 Voice of America, supra note 17. 
24 Id. The AFL-CIO targets legislation involving the minimum wage and 
safety measures in the workplace, as well as seeking to prevent the spread of 
Right to Work laws to states in which this legislation is not currently enacted. Id. 
A Right to Work Law is “a state law that prevents labor-management 
agreements requiring a person to join a union as a condition of employment.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 615 (2nd Pocket ed. 2001). Recently, the AFL-CIO 
has encouraged the enactment of union neutrality laws by states, including New 
York Labor Law Section 211-a. See infra Part III.A. 
25 Braid, supra note 17. 
26 Peter M. Panken, Union Organizing and NLRB Representation Cases: A 
Management Perspective, SK083 ALI-ABA 421, 427 (2005). For a 
comprehensive discussion of the procedures for a secret ballot election, see id. at 
427-31. 
27 Id. at 428-29. Unions usually want the time between the filing of the 
petition and the holding of the election to be minimized, so that the employer 
has less time to communicate the disadvantages of a union to its employees. Id. 
at 429. 
28 Norman Poltenson, Judge Throws Out ‘Labor Neutrality Law’, 19 BUS. J 
- CENT. N.Y. 1 (May 20, 2005). 
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card-check eliminates the need for organizing campaigns and 
secret ballots by merely requiring that the union present the 
employer with union authorization cards signed by a majority of 
the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit in order for the 
union to be recognized.29 Organized labor lobbied to amend federal 
labor law to permit card checks to serve as a substitute for secret 
ballot elections in determining a union’s majority status.30 Though 
unsuccessful, its movement to formalize permissible voluntary 
recognition through advance card check agreements with 
employers has seen greater success.31 
An alternative method employed by unions is to obtain 
neutrality agreements from employers through private bargaining 
efforts.32 Neutrality agreements generally require that an employer 
maintain a neutral position during a union’s campaign to organize 
the employer’s workforce.33 Under a typical neutrality agreement, 
the employer will voluntarily recognize the union upon a showing 
of authorization cards signed by the majority of its employees.34 
Additional provisions may also be found in neutrality agreements, 
such as a “gag order” on employer communication to employees 
about its views on unionization and permitting the union to access 
the employer’s facilities to distribute pro-union literature.35 While 
                                                          
29 Id. 
30 Braid, supra note 17. 
31 Id. According to data provided by the AFL-CIO, in 2004 between 
150,000 and 200,000 employees were organized through card-check 
agreements, while only 70,000 employees were organized through traditional 
NLRB secret ballot election processes. See Stief & Treacy, supra note 18. 
32 See Roger C. Hartley, Non-Legislative Labor Law Reform and Pre-
Recognition Labor Neutrality Agreements: The Newest Civil Rights Movement, 
22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 369, 372 (2001) (“[a] central component of the 
unions’ transformed organizing strategy is greater reliance on the pre-
recognition neutrality agreement negotiated with an employer whose employees 
a union is attempting to organize”). 
33 Joseph A. Barker, Keeping Neutrality Agreements Neutral, 84 MICH B.J. 
33, 36 (Aug. 2005). 
34 See generally George N. Davies, Neutrality Agreements: Basic 
Principles of Enforcement and Available Remedies, 16 LAB. LAW. 215 (Fall 
2000) (describing provisions contained in neutrality agreements). 
35 See Charles I. Cohen, Neutrality Agreements: Will the NLRB Sanction its 
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these agreements may seem counterintuitive to employers’ 
interests, employers may be willing to compromise their right to 
oppose union organizing efforts for various reasons, such as to take 
advantage of business opportunities that may be available solely to 
employers of union members.36 
Major national unions consider the attainment of neutrality 
agreements to be an important contemporary mechanism for 
reversing the declining influence of unions in the private 
workforce,37 and the AFL-CIO has promoted this contractual 
approach for shifting the context in which organizing occurs.38 The 
neutrality agreements are advantageous to unions in that they assist 
them in their efforts to increase membership by bypassing the 
NLRB’s time-consuming, expensive, and ultimately unpredictable 
process.39 However, there are various obstacles to the unions’ 
attainment of neutrality agreements. One such obstacle is that some 
employees have filed complaints with the NLRB against unions 
seeking to overthrow card check and neutrality agreements and 
impose the traditional secret ballot election, because the employees 
believe the agreements are attempts to coerce them to join unions 
                                                          
Own Obsolescence? 16 LAB. LAW. 201, 203 (Fall 2000) (describing numerous 
provisions in neutrality agreement beyond the maintenance of campaign 
neutrality). 
36 See Barker, supra note 33, at 34 (describing multiple reasons for why 
employers may agree to negotiate union neutrality agreements). 
37 Cohen, supra note 35 at 202 (noting that numerous national unions in a 
variety of industries have successfully secured neutrality agreements with 
employers). 
38 Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Union Organizing Under Neutrality 
and Card Check Agreements, 55 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 42 (Oct. 2001). 
39 Cohen, supra note 35, at 202. See also Barker, supra note 33, at 34 
(noting that the unions may seek neutrality agreements to circumvent the delay 
and uncertainty inherent in the secret ballot election process). While the unions 
win about 50% of secret ballot elections conducted by the NLRB, they win 
almost 90% of the cases where a card check or neutrality agreement is 
employed. Id. See also BRADLEY W. KAMPAS & SCOTT OBORNE, NINTH CIRCUIT 
STRIKES DOWN CALIFORNIA’S UNION-NEUTRALITY LEGISLATION, 2004-7 
BENDER’S LABOR & EMP. BULL. 1 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2004) (noting 
that a 1999 AFL-CIO study determined that unions win 84% of elections when 
employers are bound by one-sided neutrality clauses). 
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against their will.40 A significant barrier to the unionizing 
technique is employer opposition because neutrality agreements 
require an employer’s authorization.41 Unsurprisingly, organized 
labor considers the removal of employer opposition to be of the 
highest priority.42 
Due to the limitations of negotiated union neutrality 
agreements, unions have recently turned their efforts toward 
fervently lobbying for legislation that encourages or mandates 
employer neutrality at the state and local levels.43 Unions seeking 
to organize new members have particularly targeted nonprofit 
employers whose source of funding is primarily derived from the 
state government in their push for legislation preventing employers 
who receive state money from using such funds to discourage 
unionization.44 This legislation starkly differs from privately 
negotiated neutrality agreements. In private neutrality agreements, 
employers expressly and voluntarily agree to waive their right to 
communicate with employees through provisions negotiated with 
the union.45 The neutrality agreement formulated as a result of 
private bargaining between the employer and union often contains 
express provisions that allow the employer to respond to employee 
questions or to misrepresentations by the union.46 In contrast, state 
                                                          
40 See Barbara Wieland, Neutrality Pacts Hit Nerve for Workers, LANSING 
STATE JOURNAL, May 16, 2004, at 1D (explaining how employees at Dana 
Corp.’s plant filed complaints with the NLRB against the United Auto Workers 
union). 
41 Cohen, supra note 35, at 201. The agreements may also be subject to 
unfair labor practices. See Barker, supra note 33, at 34 (describing possible legal 
challenges to union neutrality laws). See also Davies, supra note 34 (providing a 
comprehensive analysis of the legal and practical issues arising from the 
negotiation and implementation of neutrality agreements). 
42 Lewis, supra note 7. 
43 Id. 
44 See Nicholas D’Ambrosio, New York’s Labor Neutrality Law Struck 
Down by Court, THE BUSINESS REVIEW, June 10, 2005, available at 
http://www.bizjournals.com/albany/stories/2005/06/13/smallb2.html. 
45 Cohen, supra note 35, at 207. The NLRA protects employers’ free 
speech rights. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c). See infra Part IV.A.1. 
46 Appellees’ Brief in Opposition at n.15, HANYS, No. 05-2570 (2d Cir. 
argued Feb. 10, 2006). 
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imposed union neutrality laws compel limitations on employer 
communications about unions regardless of their willingness to 
have the expression of their views restricted.47 
There have been many recent proposals for legislation 
prohibiting employers who receive state government funding from 
spending those funds to advocate for or against unionization.48 
Although many of these proposals were vetoed or died in 
committee,49 the New York State legislature enacted Labor Law 
Section 211-a in 1996, which commands that employers shall not 
use state funds for certain specified acts to discourage or encourage 
union organizing.50 Employers, unions, and the State all have 
differing views on the statute. Employers facing union 
organization campaigns have bitterly nicknamed Section 211-a the 
“employers’ gag law” and view the law as a measure to defeat 
employer opposition to union organization.51 Conversely, New 
York State’s position, as articulated by Governor Pataki, is that 
Section 211-a is a “union neutrality law” which seeks to ensure 
that taxpayers’ money is used for its intended purpose.52 Unions 
favor the law for its allegedly pro-union effect of providing 
protection for workers seeking to organize unions.53 Rather than 
                                                          
47 Id. (noting that state union neutrality laws impose a “one size fits all” 
neutrality policy on employers). 
48 California’s “union neutrality” law is codified as Cal. Govt. Code §§ 
16645-49. Similar statutes are, or have been, under consideration in a number of 
states. For a listing of proposed union neutrality statutes and their outcomes in 
various state legislatures see John Logan, Innovations in State and Local Labor 
Legislation, in 3 THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA LABOR 181, 196-98 
(Institute for Labor and Employment ed., University of California Press 2003). 
Additionally, a number of local government entities, such as Milwaukee County, 
have passed similar regulations. See Metropolitan Milwaukee Ass’n of 
Commerce v. Milwaukee County, 359 F. Supp. 2d 749 (E.D. Wis. 2005) 
(holding that Milwaukee’s union neutrality law which applies to contractors is 
not preempted by the NLRA). 
49 See Logan, supra note 48, at 196-98. 
50 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 211-a (McKinney 1996) (amended 2002). 
51 Poltenson, supra note 28, at 1. 
52 HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 9. 
53 Id. (noting that the President of New York State’s AFL-CIO declared 
that Section 211-a “ensures that taxpayer dollars will not be used to interfere 
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seeking to obtain neutrality agreements with individual employers, 
today many unions have refocused their efforts by pushing for the 
adoption of state and local legislation encouraging or mandating 
employer neutrality.54 While the unions’ efforts have been met 
with success in a few state legislatures, these union neutrality laws 
are beginning to be tested in the courts and because they impose 
limitations on the employers’ free speech, a zone protected by 
Congress, they may be found to be preempted. 
II. THE NLRA AND THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE 
Labor-management relations policy in the United States is 
governed by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).55 The 
preemption doctrine establishes that the NLRA has primacy over 
all competing state efforts to regulate labor relations, in order to 
ensure the uniformity of labor policy throughout the United 
States.56 The Supreme Court has established two theories of NLRA 
preemption over state laws: the Garmon preemption and the 
Machinists preemption.57 Significantly, however, any finding of 
preemption requires that the state is engaging in conduct that 
constitutes regulation of the overall labor market.58 The NLRA 
therefore does not preempt state conduct when it acts as a 
proprietor or market participant.59 When a state act institutes labor 
conditions on parties in the same manner as a private contractor, 
then the state is merely participating in the market in its own self-
interest, and consequently the market participant exception will 
apply.60 
                                                          
with a worker’s constitutional right to join a union”) 
54 KAMPAS & OBORNE, supra note 39. 
55 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT: LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 12. 
56 Id. 
57 Befort & Smith, supra note 8, at 107. 
58 Id. at 115 (noting that the preemption doctrine will not be implicated 
where the state engages in conduct that directly effects the parties in a labor 
dispute but does not constitute regulation). 
59 51 C.J.S. LABOR RELATIONS § 42. 
60 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT: LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 12. 
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A. Brief History of the NLRA 
In 1935, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA)61 to provide uniform federal regulation of the 
workplace.62 The NLRA continues to be the foundation for labor 
law in the United States.63 The NLRA sets forth the various rules 
and values governing private sector labor management relations,64 
including the right of workers to organize and bargain 
collectively.65 In its original form, the NLRA was biased in favor 
of organized labor, in that it solely protected employees from 
abuses by their employers.66 However, it was later modified with 
the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 and the Landrum-
Griffin Act in 1959, which set forth prohibitions on certain union 
conduct,67 providing for a more neutral policy towards employers 
and unions. 
B. Basis of Preemption of State Law by the NLRA 
In examining the many provisions contained in the NLRA, one 
will not find any explicit declaration of the Act’s preemptive 
effect.68 Since Congress has remained silent on the issue of 
preemption, the preemptive effect of the NLRA is, to a large 
extent, a judicially-created doctrine.69 The Supreme Court in 
particular has expanded the Act’s preemptive effects through its 
invalidation of numerous state efforts to regulate labor relations.70 
The courts have reasoned that the NLRA was created because the 
                                                          
61 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69. 
62 1-1 LABOR & EMP. LAW § 1.01 (Matthew & Bender & Co., Inc. 2005). 
63 RABIN, supra note 17, at 15. 
64 Id. 
65 29 U.S.C. § 151. 
66 LABOR & EMP. LAW § 1.01, supra note 62. 
67 See id. (explaining the changes to the NLRA imposed by the Taft-
Hartley and Landrum-Griffin Acts). 
68 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT: LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 12 at 
n.2. 
69 Id. at 1. 
70 Id. 
CHARISH MACROED CORRECTED 07-30-06.DOC 7/30/2006 12:35 PM 
 PREEMPTION OF NEW YORK LABOR LAW 791 
states were unable to achieve stable labor relations on their own.71 
With a firm belief that the preemption doctrine seeks to ensure 
uniform standards for labor policy throughout the United States, 
the courts have consistently held that the NLRA trumps state 
efforts to regulate labor relations.72 More specifically, in 2003 the 
Second Circuit recognized the principle that the Supremacy Clause 
of the United States Constitution ensures that federal law has 
priority over state law whenever there is conflict among them, and 
that the NLRA’s preemptive effect derives from Congress’ 
“unambiguous intent” in enacting the NLRA to limit state 
regulation of activity related to labor-management relations.73 Two 
separate forms of NLRA preemption have emerged that address 
state laws that improperly regulate labor relations—Garmon 
preemption and Machinist preemption.74 
1. Garmon Preemption 
The Garmon doctrine prohibits state regulation of activities 
that are arguably protected by section 7 of the NLRA, and forbids 
state regulation of conduct arguably constituting an unfair labor 
practice under section 8.75 Hence, the NLRA preempts not merely 
state regulation that actually conflicts with the NLRA’s provisions, 
but also state regulation of conduct that is arguably protected or 
                                                          
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Rondout Elec., Inc. v. N.Y. State Dept. of Labor, 335 F.3d 162, 166 (2d 
Cir. 2003). 
74 See Robert Rachal, Machinists Preemption Under the NLRA: A Powerful 
Tool to Protect an Employer’s Freedom to Bargain, 58 LA. L. REV. 1065, 1066 
(Summer 1998). 
75 Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of the Metro. Dist. v. Associated 
Builders & Contractors of Mass./R.I., Inc., (Boston Harbor) 507 U.S. 218, 224 
(1993) (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 
(U.S. 1959)). Section 7 of the NLRA protects employees’ right to form or join a 
union, collectively bargain, and “engage in other concerted activities for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 
157. Section 8 of the NLRA prohibits employers and unions from committing 
unfair labor practices, including interference with employees’ section 7 rights. 
29 U.S.C. § 158. 
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prohibited by the NLRA.76 The Garmon preemption was set forth 
in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,77 in which the 
Supreme Court concluded that a state court could not award 
damages to an employer resulting from peaceful picketing by 
unions, because the picketing was arguably protected by section 7 
of the NLRA, or arguably constituted an unfair labor practice 
under section 8.78 In this case, the unions, none of which were 
selected by a majority of employees as their collective bargaining 
agent, engaged in peaceful picketing, which resulted in economic 
injuries to the employers.79 The California state court awarded 
damages to the employers.80 However, on appeal, the Supreme 
Court held that the state court was precluded from awarding the 
employers damages because the picketing activity was potentially 
regulated by federal law; the picketing was arguably protected by 
section 7 of the NLRA or arguably constituted an unfair labor 
practice under section 8.81 Thus evolved what is termed the 
Garmon preemption doctrine, by which issues legislated in the 
NLRA may not be regulated by legislation of the individual states. 
The Garmon preemption doctrine exists to prevent states from 
regulating activities that may conflict with national labor policy.82 
It is based upon the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, by which the 
issue of whether the NLRA protects or prohibits state conduct is 
determined by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) as 
opposed to being resolved by the state courts.83 
The Supreme Court has established two exceptions to the 
                                                          
76 Befort & Smith, supra note 8, at 110. 
77 359 U.S. 236 (1959). 
78 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (U.S. 
1959). 
79 BRUCE HARRISON & RANDI KLEIN HYATT, PROJECT LABOR 
AGREEMENTS AND THE GOVERNMENT: HAS THE MARKET PARTICIPATION 
EXCEPTION COME TO SWALLOW THE FEDERAL PREEMPTION RULE?, 5-2 
BENDER’S LABOR & EMP. BULL. 2 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2005). 
80 Garmon, 359 U.S. at 237-38. 
81 Id. at 244. 
82 Id. at 246. 
83 2-36 LABOR AND EMP. LAW § 36.05 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2005). 
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Garmon preemption.84 First, under what is referred to as the 
“peripheral concern exception,” state regulations will not be 
preempted where the activity regulated is a mere peripheral 
concern of federal labor law.85 In determining whether this 
exception is applicable, the courts focus on the likelihood that the 
state will regulate conduct that the NLRA protects or prohibits.86 
Second, under the local interest exception, state regulation will not 
be preempted where the feelings of strong local interests are 
involved.87 Typically, the courts have found this exception to apply 
where the state regulation is rooted in violence, threats, 
intimidation, and obstruction of property.88 The Court has 
expanded the local interest exception to apply to defamation 
actions based on claims of malicious libel,89 and to a state claim 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.90 However, not all 
state tort claims raise significant enough state concerns to avoid 
preemption by federal labor law; business torts, for example, are 
generally found to fall outside of the local interest exception.91 
While these two open-ended exceptions to the Garmon doctrine 
could have broad applications, they have been interpreted narrowly 
by the courts.92 
                                                          
84 Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243-44. 
85 Id. 
86 LABOR AND EMP. LAW § 36.05, supra note 83 (citing Belknap, Inc. v. 
Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983)). 
87 Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244. 
88 LABOR AND EMP. LAW § 36.05, supra note 83. See e.g. United Constr. 
Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) (holding that federal 
labor law did not preempt an employer’s state law claim in the nature of a tort 
action for damages arising from a union’s threats of violence, even though the 
threats arguably constituted an unfair labor practice under the NLRA). 
89 LABOR AND EMP. LAW § 36.05, supra note 83 (citing Linn v. Plant Guard 
Workers Union, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966)). 
90 LABOR AND EMP. LAW § 36.05, supra note 83 (citing Farmer v. United 
Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977) (holding that 
claims regarding discrimination were preempted, but the state outrageous 
conduct claim was not preempted)). 
91 LABOR AND EMP. LAW § 36.05, supra note 83. 
92 Id. 
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2. Machinist Preemption 
The Machinist doctrine prevents states from interfering with 
the use of economic weapons by parties to a labor-management 
dispute during the course of collective bargaining, even if the 
NLRA does not explicitly protect the use of those weapons.93 In 
Lodge 76, International Association of Machinists v. Wisconsin 
Employee Relations Commission,94 the Supreme Court set forth the 
Machinist preemption by holding that the NLRA preempts the 
authority of a state labor board to enjoin a union from refusing to 
work overtime because it is an economic self-help activity that 
Congress intended to leave unregulated.95 In this case, the union 
members refused to work overtime during negotiations for the 
renewal of an expired collective bargaining agreement with the 
employer.96 The employer filed a complaint with the NLRB, 
asserting that this refusal constituted an unfair labor practice under 
the NLRA.97 The NLRB determined that the refusal did not violate 
the NLRA, and therefore dismissed the charge.98 The employer 
also filed an unfair labor practice complaint with the Wisconsin 
Employees Relations Commission.99 This state labor board 
determined that the refusal constituted an unfair labor practice 
under state law, and consequently ordered the union to desist from 
its refusal to work overtime.100 The Wisconsin state court affirmed 
the state labor board order.101 However, on appeal the Supreme 
Court reversed the lower court’s affirmation because the union’s 
concerted refusal to work overtime was peaceful conduct and 
Congress did not intend for the states to regulate such peaceful 
self-help activity.102 Thus evolved what is termed the Machinist 
                                                          
93 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT: LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 12. 
94 427 U.S. 132 (1976). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 HARRISON & HYATT, supra note 79. 
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preemption doctrine, by which issues not expressly legislated in 
the NLRA, but which are deemed contrary to the spirit of national 
labor policy, may not be regulated by legislation of the individual 
states. 
The Machinist doctrine recognizes that Congress intended for 
some activities to be left unregulated and to be controlled instead 
by the free play of economic forces,103 in contrast to the Garmon 
doctrine which seeks to preserve the NLRB’s primary jurisdiction 
by rendering invalid state conduct that the NLRA arguably protects 
or prohibits.104 The Machinist preemption affects attempts by the 
state to restrict the economic self-help weapons that may be 
utilized by the employer or union during a labor dispute, such as 
strikes, lockouts, or slowdowns.105 Employers as well as unions 
have the right to use economic weapons where more peaceful 
measures are unavailing.106 State regulation of conduct essential to 
an economic conflict between labor and management conflicts 
with protections rooted in national labor policy and is preempted 
under the Machinist doctrine, even though federal labor law does 
not expressly protect the conduct.107 
3. Market Participant Exception to Garmon and Machinist 
Preemption 
In Building and Construction Trades Council of the 
Metropolitan District v. Associated Builders & Contractors of 
Massachusetts/Rhode Island, Inc. (“Boston Harbor”), the Supreme 
Court created an exception to the Garmon and Machinist 
preemption doctrines, commonly known as the market participant 
exception, which permits states to act in a proprietary capacity.108 
                                                          
103 Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aero. Workers v. Wis. Employment 
Relations Comm’n (Machinists), 427 U.S. 132, 144 (U.S. 1976). 
104 LABOR AND EMP. LAW § 36.05, supra note 83. 
105 HARRISON & HYATT, supra note 79. 
106 Robert Rachal, Machinists Preemption Under the NLRA: A Powerful 
Tool to Protect an Employer’s Freedom to Bargain, 58 LA. L. REV. 1065, 1068 
(Summer 1998). 
107 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT: LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 12. 
108 Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 227. See Logan, supra note 48, at 115. 
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In Boston Harbor, the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority 
(MWRA), a state agency providing sewage services, hired Kaiser 
Engineers as its project manager for a project to clean up the 
pollution in Boston Harbor.109 Kaiser negotiated a labor agreement 
with Building and Construction Trades Counsel, and MWRA 
mandated that Bid Specification 13.1 be incorporated into its 
solicitation of bids for work on the project.110 Bid Specification 
13.1 stipulated that each successful bidder must agree to abide by 
the labor agreement’s provisions.111 The Court of Appeals 
concluded that Bid Specification 13.1 was preempted by the 
NLRA under both the Garmon and the Machinist preemption.112 
However, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the NLRA 
does not preempt a valid pre-hire labor agreement negotiated by 
private parties where the state authority acted as an owner of a 
construction project.113 The Court distinguished between the state 
government acting as a regulator and as a proprietor.114 The Court 
articulated that NLRA preemption solely applies to state regulation 
of labor and not to a state’s interactions with private organizations 
in the marketplace.115 
While circuit courts diverge in their application of the market 
participant exception,116 the Second Circuit during its market 
participant analysis cited with approval the test applied by the Fifth 
Circuit in Cardinal Towing.117 This test involves a two-part 
                                                          
109 Id. at 220-21. 
110 Id. at 221-22. 
111 Id. at 222 (specifically, Bid Specification 13.1 provided that “each 
successful bidder and any and all levels of subcontractors, as a condition of 
being awarded a contract or subcontract, will agree to abide by the provisions of 
the . . . [labor agreement] . . . and will be bound by the provisions of that 
agreement in the same manner as any provision of the contract”). 
112 Id. at 223-24. 
113 Id. at 218-19. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 15. 
117 180 F.3d 686 (5th Cir. 1999); HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 7 (citing 
Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Mills, 283 F.3d 404, 420 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that 
the Telecommunications Act did not preempt school officials from seeking 
enforcement of the provisions of their lease because the school officials acted in 
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analysis: 
First, does the challenged action essentially reflect the 
entity’s own interest in its efficient procurement of needed 
goods and services, as measured by comparison with the 
typical behavior of private parties in similar circumstances? 
Second, does the narrow scope of the challenged action 
defeat an inference that its primary goal was to encourage a 
general policy rather than address a specific proprietary 
                                                          
a proprietary capacity). The Federal District Court for the Northern District of 
New York in NextG Networks of N.Y. v. City of N.Y. also specifically articulated 
the Cardinal Towing test in its analysis of whether the City’s actions were 
proprietary or regulatory. NextG Networks of N.Y., Inc. v. City of New York, 
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25063 at *17 (N.D.N.Y. 2004). A second test, the Sage 
Hospitality test, derived from Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees 
Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality Resources, LLC, emerged in the Third 
Circuit for deciding whether the market participant exception applies. Hotel 
Employees & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality 
Resources, LLC, 390 F.3d 206 (3rd Cir. 2004). The Sage Hospitality test 
employs a two-part analysis for which the second factor is substantially similar 
to Cardinal Towing, but the first factor does not suggest that the state has to 
prove that its action is typical of the actions of private entities. HANYS, 388 F. 
Supp. 2d at 15. The district court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin in 
Metropolitan Milwaukee Association of Commerce v. Milwaukee County 
(MMAC) employed the Sage Hospitality test, but was reversed by the Seventh 
Circuit, which engaged in an analysis consistent with Cardinal Towing. Metro. 
Milwaukee Ass’n of Commerce v. Milwaukee County, 431 F.3d 277, 282 (7th 
Cir. 2005) (“[I]f the state is intervening in the labor relations just of firms from 
which it buys services, and it is doing so in order to reduce the cost or increase 
the quality of those services rather than to displace the authority of the National 
Labor Relations Act and the National Labor Relations Board, there is no 
preemption.”); See Reply Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 15, HANYS, No. 
05-2750 (2d Cir. argued Feb. 10, 2006). In HANYS, the district court chose to 
apply the Cardinal Towing standard, but did not require the state to prove that 
its conduct is “typical of similarly situated private entities” because it agreed 
with the district court’s reasoning in MMAC that states often act in areas that 
private parties do not. HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 17. Since the district court’s 
decision in MMAC has been reversed, and both parties concede that Cardinal 
Towing is the appropriate test to apply in the Second Circuit, this Note asserts 
that Section 211-a is subject to the Cardinal Towing test in determining whether 
the market participant exception saves it from NLRA preemption. See Reply 
Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra, at 15. 
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problem? 118 
The first prong looks at the nature of the expenditure and 
protects comprehensive state policies with broad application from 
preemption, as long as the state is acting in a proprietary manner, 
119 which involves acting like a private entity with regard to the 
purchase of goods and services for its own use.120 The second 
prong looks at the scope of the expenditure and protects from 
preemption narrow spending decisions that do not have the effect 
of broader social regulation.121 
A point of contention currently exists on whether Section 211-a 
passes these two criteria, thereby saving it from preemption 
analysis. While the district court for the Northern District of New 
York has articulated the inapplicability of the market participant 
exception to the legislation, in accordance with a modified 
Cardinal Towing test,122 this issue is currently being considered by 
the Second Circuit.123 
III. NEW YORK’S UNION NEUTRALITY STATUTE 
In the wake of recent pressure by labor organizations on state 
legislatures to pass union 
                                                          
118 Cardinal Towing & Auto Repair, Inc. v. City of Bedford, Tex., 180 F.3d 
686, 693 (5th Cir. 1999). 
119 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT: LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 12, 
quoting Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Lockyer (Lockyer I), 364 
F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004). 
120 JAMES E. BODDY, JR., PREEMPTED OR NOT PREEMPTED - A RECENT 
DECISION ADDRESSES LABOR PEACE AGREEMENTS FOR GOVERNMENT 
CONTRACTORS, 5-6 BENDER’S LABOR & EMP. BULL. 1 (Matthew Bender & Co., 
Inc. 2005). 
121 Id. 
122 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
123 Similarly, a federal district court and the Ninth Circuit in a three judge 
panel in Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Lockyer declared that the 
California union neutrality statute was not saved from preemption by the market 
participant exception. 364 F.3d at 1159. A rehearing en banc was later granted 
and the Ninth Circuit’s holding was recently withdrawn by the en banc court. 
See infra note 164 and accompanying text. 
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neutrality statutes,124 New York State enacted its own version 
in 1996 through Section 211-a of the New York Labor Law.125 The 
law in its original form underwent various revisions in 2002, which 
consequently broadened its scope as well as set forth reporting and 
enforcement measures.126 Approximately nine years after the law’s 
original enactment, the federal district court for the Northern 
District of New York ruled that the law is preempted by the 
NLRA.127 
A. The Legislative History and the Original 1996 Version of 
New York’s Union Neutrality Law 
In 1996, a Bill was introduced to the New York State Senate 
seeking to amend the New York Labor Law. The Bill’s designated 
purpose was to prevent state funds from being used to train 
managers and supervisors in methods to unfairly influence labor 
relations.128 The justification for the Bill was an awareness of 
various instances in which state funds were being used by 
employers to finance anti-unionization seminars, and the desire to 
prohibit state funds from being utilized to finance activities 
contrary to the right of employees to organize and to engage in 
collective bargaining.129 The Bill specifically noted one instance in 
which the Office of Aging sponsored a seminar where a labor 
attorney from an anti-union firm performed a work-shop on 
methods to avoid unionization in the nursing home industry.130 
Local 1199 of the Service Employees International Union, a 
politically powerful New York City-based health care union and 
the largest union representing healthcare employees in New York 
State, and the AFL-CIO heavily lobbied for the Bill.131 Various 
                                                          
124 See supra Part I. 
125 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 211-a (McKinney 1996) (amended 2002). 
126 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 211-a (McKinney 2002). 
127 HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d 6 (N.D.N.Y. 2005). 
128 Assemb. 8058, 219th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1996). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Tamara Loomis, Statute Limiting Anti-Union Activity Takes Effect Dec. 
29, 228 N.Y. L.J. 1 (Dec. 12, 2002). 
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unions, including the New York State chapter of the AFL-CIO, 
New York State United Teachers, the Civil Service Employees 
Association, and the Public Employees Federation also wrote 
letters to Governor Pataki urging him to support the Bill.132 These 
unions emphasized their belief that the Bill, if enacted, would 
protect the rights of New York employees to organize for 
collective bargaining by prohibiting the use of state funds in anti-
union efforts.133 Opponents of the Bill asserted that it was 
unnecessary because there had been very few instances in which 
state funds were used to discourage unionization.134 
Despite opposition from employers, on August 8, 1996, New 
York enacted the Bill in Labor Law Section 211-a, which went into 
effect on October 7, 1996.135 Initially, the law prohibited 
employers from using state funds for the purpose of training 
supervisory or managerial employees in methods of discouraging 
union organization.136 The law in its original form, therefore, was 
solely targeted at employers who actively discouraged unionization 
as part of employee training.137 Additionally, the original law did 
not include provisions for enforcement or penalties for 
violations.138 New York unions complained that due to the lack of 
such provisions, employers were able to evade the law simply by 
asserting that they were spending state funds to teach managers 
about compliance with the NLRA.139 In order to remedy the 
perceived flaws in Section 211-a, major labor organizations 
fervently lobbied for amendments to the law.140 These labor 
                                                          
132 Assemb. 8058, 219th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1996). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 211-a (McKinney 1996) (amended 2002). 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Logan, supra note 48, at 181 n.67. The original law merely provided: 
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no monies appropriated by the 
state for any purpose shall be used or made available to employers to train 
managers, supervisors, or other administrative personnel regarding methods to 
discourage union organization.” N.Y. LAB. LAW § 211-a (McKinney 1996). 
139 Logan, supra note 48, at 181 n.67. 
140 Charles H. Kaplan, et al., N.Y. Employers Face New Laws on Smoking, 
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organizations urged the State to adopt stricter, more effective 
measures that would prohibit all employers receiving state funding, 
including private healthcare organizations that accept Medicaid 
reimbursements and other funds for treatment and services 
provided to their patients, from using these funds to encourage or 
discourage union activities.141 
B. New York’s 2002 Amended Union Neutrality Law 
Governor Pataki signed into effect amendments to Section 211-
a on December 29, 2002.142 These amendments greatly broadened 
the scope of the union neutrality law in a number of ways.143 First, 
as amended, Section 211-a prohibits employers from using state 
funds not only to discourage union organization, but also to 
encourage such activity.144 The legislature expressly declared in 
the Section its justification for the law: 
[W]hen public funds are appropriated for the purchase of 
specific goods and/or the provision of needed services, and 
those funds are instead used to encourage or discourage 
union organization, the proprietary interests of the state are 
adversely affected. As a result, the legislature declares that 
the use of state funds and property to encourage or 
discourage employees from union organization constitutes 
a misuse of the public funds and a misapplication of scarce 
resources, which should be utilized solely for the public 
purpose for which they were appropriated.145 
The scope of the law reaches any employer who does business 
with New York State, including healthcare, social services, 
                                                          
Discrimination, Organizing, Layoffs, LAB. & EMP. DEP’T. (Thelen Reid & 
Priest), May 12, 2003, at 3, http://www.constructionweblinks.com/ 
Resources/Industry_Reports__Newsletters/May_12_2003/NY_employment_law
s.htm. 
141 John Caher, Judge Strikes Barring Discussion of Union Activity, N.Y. 
L.J. (May 20, 2005). 
142 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 211-a (McKinney 2002). 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at § 211-a(2). 
145 Id. at § 211-a(1). 
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universities, and other not-for-profit organizations that generally 
receive the most state money and are largely dependent upon state 
funding such as Medicare or Medicaid payments.146 
Second, the amendments expand the coverage of the statute by 
specifying prohibited activities, including the training of managers, 
the hiring or paying of attorneys or consultants, or the hiring or 
compensating of employees to either encourage or discourage 
union organization.147 The law requires detailed accounting and 
financial reporting requirements.148 Employers who receive state 
funds and engage in activities to encourage or discourage union 
organization must maintain valid and accurate financial records 
that sufficiently demonstrate that state funds were not used to pay 
for such activities.149 The state agency providing the funds to the 
employer and the New York State Attorney General could request 
to review these financial records at any time, and the employer is 
obligated to provide the records within ten business days of this 
request.150 Moreover, the statute grants the New York State 
Attorney General specific enforcement powers in the form of 
seeking orders to enjoin the commission of a violation of the 
law.151 A court may order the return of any misspent funds to the 
State and the imposition of civil penalties up to one thousand 
dollars.152 Additionally, courts have the authority to impose 
penalties greater than the amount unlawfully expended where the 
employer knowingly violated the statute or engaged in a previous 
violation within the preceding two years.153 
Lastly, the 2002 version of Section 211-a contains a provision 
authorizing the New York State Labor Commissioner to formulate 
                                                          
146 Kaplan, supra note 140. See also Braid, supra note 17. The plaintiffs in 
HANYS alleged that they and their member providers receive between 80 and 
100% of their revenue from government sources. See Complaint, HANYS ¶¶ 17-
21. 
147 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 211-a(2). 
148 HANYS, 388 F. Supp 2d at 9. 
149 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 211-a(3). 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at § 211-a(4). 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
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regulations that describe both the form and content of the required 
financial records, and to render guidance to state entities as to the 
enforcement of the law through the development of contractual and 
administrative measures.154 
C. Healthcare Association of New York State, Inc. v. Pataki 
Ruled that Section 211-a is Preempted. 
On October 30, 2002, Margery E. Lieber, Assistant General 
Counsel for Special Litigation for the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB), wrote to Linda Angello, New York State Labor 
Commissioner, expressing the NLRB’s concerns that Section 211-
a may be preempted by the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA).155 On January 30, 2003, officials from the New York 
State Attorney General’s Labor Bureau and the State’s Department 
of Labor sent a response to the NLRB156 defending the validity of 
Section 211-a as a legally permissible choice by the State not to 
fund certain activities.157 During this time, a group of healthcare 
and social service associations in New York wrote a letter to 
NLRB General Counsel Arthur Rosenfeld and the Special 
Litigation Branch, seeking an injunction to prevent the 
enforcement of Section 211-a, or alternatively, seeking to intervene 
in actions that the NLRB intended to bring in federal court.158 The 
NLRB did not respond to the request.159 
On April 3, 2003, a coalition of healthcare organizations 
representing over 550 non-profit and public hospitals, nursing 
                                                          
154 Id. at § 211-a(5). These regulations had not yet been promulgated when 
the decision of the federal district court in HANYS that Section 211-a was 
preempted by the NLRA was rendered. Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Motion to Dismiss at 18, HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d 6 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 03 
Civ. 0413), available at 2003 WL 24152872. 
155 Herbert G. Birch, Inc., N.L.R.B. no. 29-RC-10227 (July 15, 2004), 
available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/legal/decisions/. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
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homes, and residential healthcare facilities160 filed a lawsuit in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of New York 
against the Governor, the Attorney General, and the Commissioner 
of Labor for the State of New York.161 The plaintiffs alleged that 
Section 211-a is preempted by the NLRA and is unconstitutional 
because it violates their free speech rights under the First 
Amendment and due process rights under the 14th Amendment.162 
District Judge McCurn ruled that Section 211-a is preempted by 
the NLRA under the Machinist doctrine and granted the plaintiffs 
summary judgment.163 He concluded that the Section hindered an 
                                                          
160 Logan, supra note 48, at 182. See also HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 8. 
Specifically, plaintiffs were Healthcare Association of New York State, New 
York Association of Homes and Services for the Aging, New York State Health 
Facilities Association Inc., NYSARC Inc. and United Cerebral Palsy 
Associations of New York State. HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 6. These five 
health-care organizations have members or affiliates that provide a broad range 
of health-care services. The Healthcare Association of New York State was the 
lead plaintiff, which is an organization representing 550 New York State non-
profit and public health-care organizations, including hospitals, nursing homes, 
and home-care agencies. Poltenson, supra note 28, at 1. The Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States of America, HR Policy Association, and the 
Business Council of New York State, Inc. filed an amici curiae brief in support 
of Plaintiffs. See Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., et. 
al., HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d 6 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 03-0413). On behalf of 
defendants, the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, along with 
thirty anti-poverty consumer, senior citizen, community, religious, civic, 
immigrant and advocacy organizations, filed an amicus curiae brief. See Brief of 
Amici Curiae Brennan Center for Justice, etc., HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d 6 
(N.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 03-0413). 
161 HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 8. 
162 Gerald B. Silverman, Health Care Groups Sue New York to Overturn 
Labor Organizing Law, 66 DAILY LABOR REPORT A-5 (2003). 
163  HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d 6 (N.D.N.Y. 2005). The Machinist preemption 
was promulgated in International Association of Machinists and Aerospace 
Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission. 427 U.S. 132 (1996) 
(holding that the NLRA preempted the state labor board’s order enjoining the 
union from refusing to work overtime for the employer because the NLRA 
intended to leave unregulated the economic pressure asserted by the union in its 
refusal to work the assigned overtime). The Second Circuit has determined the 
applicability of the Machinist preemption in a few contexts. The Second Circuit 
has held that New York State’s implementation of the prevailing wage 
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employer’s ability to disseminate information to employees, which 
amounted to a direct interference with the union organizing 
process recognized by the NLRA.164 The Judge further held that 
the market participant exception to preemption did not apply since 
the State was acting in a regulatory, not proprietary, capacity.165 
Judge McCurn did not reach the issue of the Garmon preemption, 
nor did he address the constitutional questions raised by the 
plaintiffs.166 The case is now on appeal in the U.S. Second 
                                                          
supplement through the annualization regulation was not prohibited by 
Machinist preemption because it had no connection to labor/management 
bargaining. Rondout Elec., Inc. v. N.Y. State DOL, 335 F.3d 162 (2d. Cir. 
2003). In contrast, the Second Circuit held that Machinist preemption did 
prohibit a state from refusing to register an electrical contractor’s apprentice 
program due to ongoing negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement 
between the union and contractors, because the refusal interfered with 
bargaining. Bldg. Trades Emplrs. Educ. Ass’n v. McGowan, 311 F.3d 501 (2d. 
Cir. 2002). In HANYS, Judge McCurn relied heavily upon the 9th Circuit’s 
decision in Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Lockyer (Lockyer I), 364 F.3d 
1154 (9th Cir. 2004) declaring that a California law prohibiting the use of state 
funds to assist, promote or deter union activity was preempted by the NLRA 
under the Machinist doctrine. Caher, supra note 141. Lockyer I was recalled for 
reconsideration by the Ninth Circuit, and the prior opinion was withdrawn with 
the Ninth Circuit affirming its decision in a three judge panel opinion. Chamber 
of Commerce of the U. S. v. Lockyer (Lockyer II), 422 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2005). 
In this opinion the Ninth Circuit held that the California law was preempted 
under both the Garmon and the Machinist doctrines and that the market 
participant exception did not apply. Id. On January, 17, 2006, a majority of 
nonrecused regular active judges ordered a rehearing en banc. Chamber of 
Commerce of the U.S. v. Lockyer, Nos. 03-55166, 03-55169, 2006 WL 158673 
(9th Cir. 2006). On February 9, 2006, the en banc court held that the opinion and 
dissent in Lockyer II are withdrawn. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. 
Lockyer, Nos. 03-55166, 03-55169, 2006 WL 302357 (9th Cir. 2006). 
164 Caher, supra note 141. 
165 NLRA; NLRA PREEMPTION: ANOTHER LOOK AT THE 
PROPRIETARY/REGULATORY DICHOTOMY; HEALTHCARE ASSOCIATION V. 
PATAKI, 2005 U.S. DIST. LEXIS 9186 (N.D.N.Y. MAY 17, 2005), 5-7 BENDER’S 
LABOR & EMP. BULL. 12 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2005) [hereinafter 
ANOTHER LOOK AT THE PROPRIETARY/REGULATORY DICHOTOMY]. 
166 Caher, supra note 141. The First Amendment and due process issues 
arising from the provisions contained in Section 211-a are beyond the scope of 
this Note. 
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Circuit.167 
On appeal, the State contends that Section 211-a is not 
preempted under the Machinists doctrine because the statute 
simply places limitations on the use of state funds and employers 
are free to use their own private funds for union-related 
activities.168 According to the State, the statute does not impose 
employer neutrality, and as such it does not regulate in a field that 
the NLRA intended to be left unregulated.169 Should the Court of 
Appeals decide to reach the issue of the Garmon preemption, the 
State maintains that Section 211-a is not preempted under this 
theory because neither the NLRA nor precedent provides 
employers with an affirmative right to present their views to 
employees.170 In any event, the State asserts that Section 211-a 
would be saved from preemption under the market participant 
exception because the State is acting as a market participant under 
Section 211-a by seeking to ensure that its appropriated funds are 
used solely for their designated purpose.171 
IV. NLRA PREEMPTS SECTION 211-A 
Due to Section 211-a’s interference with employer free speech, 
which is arguably protected by Section 8(c) of the NLRA and 
committed to the NLRB’s jurisdiction, the NLRA preempts 
Section 211-a under the Garmon preemption, should the Second 
Circuit decide to reach this issue.172 Neither the peripheral concern 
exception to the Garmon preemption nor the local interest 
exception saves Section 211-a from preemption. Since the district 
court in HANYS correctly concluded that the NLRA preempts 
                                                          
167 Press Release, Chamber of Commerce, Chamber Welcomes Ruling that 
Upholds Employer Rights Businesses Retain Right to Discuss Unionization with 
Workers (Sept. 8, 2005), http://www.uschamber.com/press/ 
releases/2005/september/05-146.htm. 
168 Reply Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 117, at 1. 
169 Id. 
170 Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 42, HANYS, No. 05-2750 (2d Cir. 
argued Feb. 10, 2006). 
171 Reply Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 117, at 15. 
172 Appellees’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 46, at 48-50. 
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Section 211-a under the Machinist preemption and that it is not 
saved from preemption by the market participant exception, it did 
not address whether the statute was also preempted under the 
Garmon preemption.173 Section 211-a’s core spending provisions 
as well as its enforcement, sanction, and record-keeping provisions 
are preempted under the Machinist doctrine due to their chilling 
effects on employer free speech, which runs counter to the 
Congressional intent to leave unfettered fundamental aspects of the 
labor-management relationship.174 The market participant 
exception to both strands of preemption is inapplicable to Section 
211-a because an application of the Cardinal Towing test reveals 
that New York State is regulating labor relations, rather than acting 
as a proprietor or market participant.175 
A. NLRA Preempts Section 211-a Under the Garmon 
Preemption 
The Garmon preemption prohibits state regulation of conduct 
that is arguably protected by the NLRA.176 A close look at the 
legislative history and relevant case-law leads to the conclusion 
that section 8(c) of the NLRA arguably protects employer free 
speech rights177 and that the NLRB has primary jurisdiction over 
employer speech through its administration of union representation 
elections.178 Section 211-a’s restriction on state funding is 
preempted under the Garmon doctrine as an impermissible 
interference with the ability of employers to express their views on 
unionization to employees in the context of a union organizing 
                                                          
173 HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 25. 
174 Appellees’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 46, at 35. 
175 HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 19-20 (holding that under the first and 
second prongs of the Cardinal Towing test, New York State is acting as a 
regulator under Section 211-a). 
176 See supra Part II.B.1. 
177 Ian M. Adams & Richard L. Wyatt, Jr., Free Speech and Administrative 
Agency Deference: Section 8(c) and the National Labor Relations BoardAn 
Expostulation on Preserving the First Amendment, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 19, 26-27 
(1996). 
178 Appellees’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 46, at 51. 
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campaign.179 Nor is Section 211-a saved from preemption by either 
of the two exceptions to the Garmon doctrine. 
1. Interference with Employer Speech Rights 
The central issue to the Garmon preemption’s application to 
Section 211-a is whether employer speech rights are actually 
protected by the NLRA in that they constitute an affirmative right, 
or at a minimum are arguably protected.180 Section 8(c) of the 
NLRA is titled: “Expression of views without threat of reprisal or 
force or promise of benefit,”181 and provides that: 
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the 
dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, 
or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an 
unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this 
Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or 
force or promise of benefit.182 
The relevant precedent and legislative history of the adoption 
of section 8(c) of the NLRA demonstrates that employer free 
speech is protected, or at least arguably protected, by the NLRA.183 
The NLRB, soon after it was created, essentially required that 
employers take a neutral stance during an election campaign.184 
The Supreme Court opposed this requirement in NLRB v. Virginia 
Electric & Power Co., holding that the First Amendment protected 
the expression of non-coercive, anti-union views by employers.185 
                                                          
179 Braid, supra note 17. 
180 See Reply Memorandum of Law at 4, HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d 6 
(N.D.N.Y 2005) (No. 03-0413), available at 2004 WL 3522317. 
181 29 U.S.C. § 158(c). 
182 Id. 
183 Adams & Wyatt, supra note 177, at 26-27. 
184 2-34 LABOR & EMP. LAW § 34.01 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2005). 
185 Id. See NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477 
(1941) “The employer in this case is as free now as ever to take any side it may 
choose on this controversial issue. But certainly conduct, though evidenced in 
part by speech, may amount in connection with other circumstances to coercion 
within the meaning of the Act. If the total activities of an employer restrain or 
coerce his employees in their free choice, then those employees are entitled to 
the protection of the Act.” Id. 
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However, the NLRB continued to hold that employers violated the 
NLRA when they expressed these anti-union viewpoints.186 
Congress thereby amended section 8(c) of the NLRA to clearly 
articulate the free speech rights of both employers and unions.187 
After the adoption of section 8(c), the NLRB articulated that it may 
invalidate an election if it found that the parties engaged in 
objectionable conduct which rendered free choice by the 
employees unlikely.188 The Supreme Court recognized that the 
congressional intent behind the establishment of section 8(c) was 
to encourage free debate on issues in which labor and management 
contain opposing viewpoints.189 In NLRB v. Gissel Packing 
Company, Inc., the Supreme Court further held that an employer is 
free to communicate to its employees its views on unionizing as 
long as the communications do not violate the express provisions 
of section 8(c), which prohibit threats of reprisal or force or 
promise of benefit.190 Section 8(c) is therefore commonly referred 
to as the employer “free speech” provision.191 
The Second Circuit has recognized that employers may express 
their opposition to the unionization of their workforce, and in 
expressing such views they are entitled to free speech protection 
under section 8(c) of the NLRA.192 According to the Second 
Circuit, section 8(c) embodies the First Amendment right of 
                                                          
186 LABOR & EMP. LAW § 34.01, supra note 184. 
187 Id. The legislative history of section 8(c) demonstrates that it was 
enacted “‘to insure both to employers and labor organizations full freedom to 
express their views to employees on labor matters.’” See Memorandum of Law 
at 8, HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 6 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 03-0413), available at 2003 
WL 24152875 (citing S. Rep. No. 80-105, at 23-24 (1947)). The drafters of 
section 8(c) clearly expressed their purpose in formulating 8(c) as preventing the 
Board from: “‘attempt[ing] to circumscribe the right of free speech [even] where 
there were also findings of unfair labor practices.’” Adams & Wyatt, supra note 
177, at 26 (citing 93 Cong. Rec. 6601 (1947)). 
188 LABOR & EMP. LAW § 34.01, supra note 184 (citing NLRB v. General 
Shoe Corp., 192 F.2d 504 (6th Cir. 1951). 
189 LABOR & EMP. LAW § 34.01, supra note 184. 
190 1-5 LABOR & EMP. LAW § 5.05 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2005) 
(citing Gissel, 395 U.S. at 617-19). 
191 Id. 
192 Beverly Enters., Inc. v. NLRB, 139 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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employers to freely communicate to their employees any of their 
opinions about unionism in general, or any of their views about a 
particular union, provided that the communications do not assert a 
threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.193 Providing the 
employer with the opportunity to communicate freely with its 
employees not only affirms the employer’s right to freedom of 
speech, but it also supports the employees by enabling them to 
make informed decisions.194 The Second Circuit has also noted that 
in drafting section 8(c), Congress sought to ensure that an 
employer’s lawful speech was not chilled “by preventing the 
[NLRB] from using anti-union statements, not independently 
prohibited by the [NLRA], as evidence of unlawful motivation” in 
a union organizing campaign.195 The Second Circuit’s continued 
acknowledgement and perpetuation of employers’ freedom of 
speech, and its recognition that this right is embodied in section 
8(c), demonstrates that New York courts have construed section 
8(c) as conferring speech rights on employers. 
The defendants in HANYS argued that the NLRB lacks the 
power to affirmatively protect employer speech, and thereby the 
Garmon preemption does not apply to Section 211-a.196 This 
argument ignores well-settled Supreme Court precedent 
recognizing the Board’s competence to judge the impact of 
statements made in the context of the labor management 
relationship.197 For instance, in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Company, 
Inc., the Supreme Court suggested that it may be appropriate for 
reviewing courts to defer to the NLRB’s inferences as to the 
lawfulness of the content of employer speech under the NLRA, 
since the NLRB has competence in this area.198 Moreover, the 
NLRB has explicitly stated that it was chosen by Congress to 
                                                          
193 Kinney Drugs v. NLRB, 74 F.3d 1419, 1428 (2d Cir. 1996). 
194 Id. 
195 Holo-Krome Co. v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 1343, 1347 (2d Cir. 1990). 
196 See Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., et. al., 
supra note 160, at 21 (citing Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss at 18, HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d 6 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 03 Civ. 0413), 
available at 2003 WL 24152872. 
197 Adams & Wyatt, supra note 177, at 32. 
198 Id. 
CHARISH MACROED CORRECTED 07-30-06.DOC 7/30/2006 12:35 PM 
 PREEMPTION OF NEW YORK LABOR LAW 811 
regulate employer speech in the representation and unfair labor 
practice areas, and as such state regulation of this activity is 
impermissible.199 The HANYS defendants also contend that section 
8(c) does not provide an affirmative employer free speech right, 
but rather is drafted as an exception to the prohibition against 
unfair labor practices.200 Since the NLRA does not include non-
coercive employer speech in any category of speech deemed an 
unfair labor practice, however, employers are free to engage in 
non-coercive speech.201 Furthermore, the NLRB has articulated 
that national labor policy provides employers and unions with the 
freedom to voice their opinions on unionization in a non-coercive 
manner.202 
In their argument against an affirmative right to employer free 
speech, the HANYS defendants argued that the source of the 
employer’s right of free speech is the First Amendment, rather than 
section 8(c) of the NLRA.203 This position ignores precedent and 
legislative history, which both demonstrate that section 8(c) 
protects and embodies the employer’s first amendment right to free 
speech.204 Significantly, in Gissel, the Supreme Court treated the 
employer’s right of speech, which is presumably preserved in both 
the First Amendment and section 8(c), as a statutory right.205 The 
enactment of section 8(c), therefore, has resulted in the NLRB 
examining employer speech by referencing the language of this 
                                                          
199 See Brief for the National Labor Relations Board as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and in Support of Affirmance at 22, HANYS, No. 
05-2570 (2d Cir. argued Feb. 10, 2006) [hereinafter NLRB Amicus Curiae 
Brief]. 
200 See Reply Memorandum of Law, supra note 180, at 4. 
201 Id. 
202 See NLRB Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 199, at 19 (citing Linn v. 
Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 62 (1966) (noting that section 8(c) manifests 
Congress’ intent to protect free debate from state regulation); Trent Tube Co., 
147 NLRB 538, 542 (1964) (holding that absent threats, the NLRB will not 
restrict the right of unions and employers to inform employees of their views on 
unionization). 
203 HANYS, 388 F. Supp 2d at 22. 
204 Adams & Wyatt, supra note 177, at 26-27. 
205 Id. at 34. 
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section and Gissel, rather than the First Amendment.206 
Section 211-a appears to impede on the affirmative freedom of 
speech conferred upon employers by the NLRA and recognized by 
the Second Circuit. The statute applies to all state contracts, 
regardless of amount.207 Employers whose budgets are entirely or 
primarily derived from state funds, principally those in the human 
or social services industries, are affected by Section 211-a’s speech 
limitations.208 Such employers may find themselves unable to 
exercise their rights to inform employees of their views of 
unionization during an organizational campaign.209 As a result of 
Section 211-a, employees would likely only hear the views of 
union organizers, which creates a coercive bias toward 
unionization.210 
Healthcare providers, as employers, further assert that Section 
211-a decreases the value of their speech rights. The healthcare 
providers in New York who are largely, if not completely, funded 
by New York State have complained that Section 211-a impeded 
them from speaking freely with their employees during 
unionization campaigns, thereby preventing healthcare workers 
from being afforded the opportunity to hear both sides of the 
unionization debate.211 New York State’s argument that the 
employers can use their own private funds aside from state grants 
towards unionization efforts212 is inapplicable to these employers, 
because these employers do not have private funds available with 
                                                          
206 Id. 
207 Kaplan, supra note 140. 
208 See Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., et. al., 
supra note 160, at 10. See also Braid, supra note 17. 
209 See Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., et. al., 
supra note 160, at 17. 
210 Braid, supra note 17. 
211 Poltenson, supra note 28, at 1. 
212 Prior to Governor Pataki signing the 2002 Bill suggesting the 
amendments to Section 211-a, the Governor’s Counsel, James McGuire, 
requested comments on the Bill from Kathy Bennett, the Chief of the Legislative 
Bureau of the Attorney General’s Office. In a memorandum, Bennett responded 
that the Bill merely prevents employers from using state funds to engage in any 
of the prohibited activities. Independence Residences, Inc. N.L.R.B. no. 29-RC-
10030 (June 7, 2004), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/legal/decisions/. 
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which to fund communications regarding unionization.213 
2. Section 211-a Does Not Fall Under Either of the Two 
Exceptions to Garmon Preemption 
Both exceptions to the Garmon preemption are inapplicable to 
Section 211-a. First, the peripheral concern exception does not 
apply here because in this case, the employers’ free speech rights 
are not peripheral to the NLRA.214 Rather, free speech rights are 
firmly established in section 8(c) of the NLRA as demonstrated by 
legislative history, congressional intent, and case law precedent.215 
A prime concern in the drafting of section 8(c) was the right to 
open debate in the face of a union organizing campaign, and the 
employees’ right to hear both sides of the debate.216 Thus, it 
appears that the concern about open debate and free speech rights 
is a fundamental component of the NLRA. 
Second, the local interest exception, which allows states to 
regulate where the feelings of strong local interests are involved, 
also is inapplicable. The local interest exception can be found in 
the traditional law of torts whereby states are permitted to grant 
compensation for violent or threatening conduct.217 All of the 
antecedents to the local interest exception cited in Garmon were 
cases in which violence, intimidation, and obstruction of property 
                                                          
213 See Frederick D. Braid Aff. ¶ 15, HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d 6 (N.D.N.Y. 
2005) (No. 03-0413) (arguing that in an NLRB election at Independence 
Residences Inc., the employer, which was virtually entirely dependent on 
government funding, could only utilize private contributions that were not 
specified in the means in which they could be used, in its efforts to communicate 
with employees during organizing campaigns.). But see Brent Garren Aff. ¶ 32, 
HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d 6 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 03-0413). (arguing that in an 
NLRB election at Independence Residences, Inc. (IRI), the employer, which was 
virtually entirely dependent on state funding, complied with Section 211-a’s 
provisions and waged an aggressive anti-union campaign that sufficiently 
provided its employees with relevant information about unionization.). 
214 See Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., et. al., 
supra note 160, at 23. 
215 See id. 
216 Id. 
217 LABOR AND EMP. LAW § 36.05, supra note 83. 
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served as the basis for state regulation.218 However, in subsequent 
decisions the court expanded the scope of the exception to include 
defamation actions that arise in the context of labor disputes and 
actions for intentional infliction of emotional harm.219 Section 211-
a does not address tort claims nor does it relate to violent or 
threatening conduct, which is the primary context with which this 
exception has been raised.220 Section 211-a also does not fit the 
further exceptions carved out in other areas for the exception. 
Likewise, the law is not deeply rooted in local feeling, and it is 
therefore not saved from preemption by the local interest 
exception.221 Thus, the NLRA preempts Section 211-a under the 
Garmon doctrine and Section 211-a is not saved from preemption 
by the two carved out exceptions. 
B. NLRA Preempts Section 211-a Under the Machinist 
Preemption Doctrine 
The Machinist preemption prohibits state regulation of 
fundamental aspects of the collective bargaining process which 
Congress intended to be left “to be controlled by the free play of 
economic forces.”222 Section 211-a’s core spending restriction 
interferes with non-coercive speech by employers, which is 
counter to the Congressional intent to protect free debate from 
regulation in the context of a union organizing campaign.223 The 
enforcement, sanction, and record-keeping provisions found in 
Section 211-a further chill employer free speech by imposing 
disincentives and compliance burdens.224 
1. Congress Intentionally Left the Area of Employer Speech 
                                                          
218 Id. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. 
221 See Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., et. al., 
supra note 160, at 24. 
222 See NLRB Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 199, at 19 (citing 
Machinists, 427 U.S. at 140). 
223 Id. 
224 Id. at 17. 
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Unregulated 
When state action has an impact on the labor-management 
relationship, it does not necessarily follow that this action would 
impede the effective implementation of the NLRA’s policies.225 As 
recognized by the Second Circuit, the Machinist preemption 
applies only where the state action regulates the use of economic 
self-help weapons that may be utilized by the employer or union 
during a labor dispute, such as strikes, lockouts, or slowdowns, 
which are recognized and protected under the NLRA.226 State 
interference with substantive aspects of the bargaining process to 
an extent that Congress would find unacceptable is preempted 
under the Machinist doctrine.227 State laws of general applicability, 
such as the regulation of labor conditions, usually are not 
preempted by the NLRA, whereas state regulations that target a 
process central to the union organizing and collective bargaining 
system established by the NLRA are generally preempted.228 
The Machinist preemption applies to Section 211-a because the 
law in effect regulates an employer’s ability to engage in non-
coercive speech to express its views regarding union 
organization.229 An employer’s ability to engage in non-coercive 
speech is conduct that Congress sought to be left unregulated in 
furtherance of the NLRA’s policies.230 Employers may want to 
convey to their employees the possible disadvantages of 
unionization, such as the costs to employees of union dues and 
fees, and whether a particular union has a record of corruption, 
                                                          
225 HANYS, 388 F. Supp 2d at 21 (citing New England Health Care, 
Employees Union, District 1199 v. Rowland, 221 F. Supp. 2d 297, 328 (D. 
Conn. 2002) (quoting New York Tel. Co. v. New York St. Dept. of Labor, 440 
U.S. 519, 531 (1979))). 
226 HANYS, 388 F. Supp 2d at 21 (citing Rondout Elec., Inc. v. N.Y. State 
DOL, 335 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
227 Id. 
228 Alcantara v. Allied Properties, LLC, 334 F. Supp. 2d 336, 342 
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting Lockyer I, 364 F.3d at 1167). 
229 HANYS, 388 F. Supp 2d at 22. 
230 Id. 
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violence, racial discrimination, or misrepresentation.231 Although 
Section 211-a does not prevent employers from utilizing private 
funds for these activities, the reality is that the state government is 
often the largest source, and in certain instances virtually the only 
source, of funding for many employers, especially in the healthcare 
industry.232 Absent the ability to train supervisors and 
administrative personnel, compensate personnel, and hire attorneys 
and consultants in efforts to convey the employer’s message on 
union organizing, the employer may be left without assistance in 
expressing its views on unionization in a manner that will not 
render unfair labor practice charges.233 Consequently, the flow of 
information to employees which may help them decide whether 
unionizing is in their best interests is hindered, thereby working at 
cross-purposes with the federal law which was designed to foster 
informed decisions by employees on unionization.234 The core 
statutory language of Section 211-a, which prohibits encouraging 
or discouraging union organization, therefore interferes with the 
union-organizing process recognized by the NLRA by restraining 
free debate regarding union organization.235 Section 211-a’s 
interference with non-coercive employer speech during a union 
organizing campaign restricts an area that Congress intended to be 
left unregulated. 
2. Section 211-a’s Enforcement, Sanction, and Record-Keeping 
Provisions Further Support Preemption 
Aside from Section 211-a’s core spending provisions 
prohibiting state funds from being used to encourage or discourage 
union organization, Section 211-a’s enforcement, sanction, and 
record-keeping provisions directly and negatively affect the union 
                                                          
231 See Memorandum of Law, supra note 184, at 9. 
232 See Brief of Amici Curiae New York State Association of Health Care 
Providers, et al. in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Affirmation of the 
District Court, at 4 n.5, HANYS, No. 05-2750 (2d Cir. argued Feb. 10, 2006). 
233 See NLRB Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 199, at 26. 
234 See Reply Memorandum of Law, supra note 180, at 3. 
235 HANYS, 388 F. Supp 2d at 22-23. 
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organizing process.236 The enforcement provisions could feasibly 
result in an injunction which, if it occurs during a union-organizing 
campaign, may have a disruptive effect on the employer’s ability 
to voice its opinion to employees.237 Also, unions can press the 
Attorney General to investigate alleged claims of misuse of state 
funds.238 In fact, the Attorney General has audited employers for 
compliance with Section 211-a during union organization 
campaigns, and some of these audits occurred due to union 
requests.239 Consequently, employers risk being accused of 
misspending state funds in any instance in which they speak about 
the merits of union organization, thereby deterring employers from 
speaking freely on such merits.240 The balance of power between 
unions and employers would therefore be interrupted because the 
mere threat of enforcement would empower the unions to extract 
concessions from employers in negotiating recognition 
agreements.241 
An additional problem is that sanctions for Section 211-a 
violations can be punitive in nature, including increased fines for 
knowing violations or criminal penalties.242 These punitive 
sanctions are at odds with the sanctions imposed by the NLRA for 
violations, which are strictly remedial.243 Additionally, threatening 
employers with fines and criminal penalties if they use state 
payments to discourage unionization is contrary to the employers’ 
rights under federal labor policy, which entitles employers to 
                                                          
236 Id. 
237 Id. 
238 See Greenberg Traurig, Greenberg Traurig Alert: Ninth Circuit Rules 
that California’s “Neutrality Statute” is Preempted by the National Labor 
Relations Act, (Sept. 2005), http://www.gtlaw.com/pub/alerts/2005/09 04.asp. 
239 NLRB Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 199, at 17 n.8. 
240 Greenberg Traurig, supra note 238. 
241 NLRB Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 199, at 17 n.8. 
242 Id. at 22. 
243 Id. (citing NLRB v. Jamaica Towing, Inc., 632 F.2d 208, 212 (2d Cir. 
1980); “Punitive sanctions are inconsistent . . . with the remedial philosophy of 
the NLRA.” Wisconsin Dept. of Industry, Labor and Human Relations v. Gould, 
475 U.S. 282, 288 n.5 (1985)). 
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discourage union representation in a number of circumstances.244 
Before the HANYS decision in 2005, the NLRB noticed Section 
211-a’s potential conflict with the concept of free debate under the 
NLRA. In a letter to the New York State Labor Commissioner on 
October 30, 2002, Margery E. Lieber, NLRB Assistant General 
Counsel for Special Litigation, expressed to the Commissioner the 
NLRB’s concerns over Section 211-a’s impact on employers’ free 
speech rights in union-organizing drives.245 The letter noted: 
[I]t appears that the labor neutrality law will effectively 
regulate conduct that is intended by Congress to be free 
from governmental interference. 
For example, the law imposes a requirement of 
employer neutrality during union organizing drives by 
restricting state funds from being used to encourage or 
discourage unionization (Section 2); imposes a burdensome 
record-keeping requirement for those employers who 
choose not to remain neutral (Section 3); and imposes 
substantial risk of punitive civil penalties and Attorney 
General prosecution of employers for any perceived 
violations of its provisions (Section 4). These provisions, 
taken together, appear to go well beyond New York’s 
choice not to fund certain conduct as they interfere with 
rights under the NLRA to freely discuss labor relations 
issues during union organizing.246 
Thus, the NLRB asserted that since Section 211-a directly 
regulates the union-organizing process itself, and imposes 
substantial compliance costs on employers who participate in that 
                                                          
244 See id. at 18 (noting that employers have the right to discourage 
representation where a union seeks recognition in an inappropriate bargaining 
unit, where the union insists upon representing supervisors or managers, or 
where the union uses coercive tactics). 
245 See Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., et. al., 
supra note 160, at 3. 
246 Id. (citing letter dated Oct. 30, 2003, from the NLRB to Commission or 
Labor Linda Angello). The Acting General Counsel of the NLRB, Arthur 
Rosenfeld, also expressed his belief that New York’s “union neutrality” law 
should be struck down because it “is a political ploy that undermines federal 
Labor Law.” Independence Residences, Inc. N.L.R.B. no. 29-RC-10030 (June 7, 
2004), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/legal/decisions/. 
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process, the statute interferes with an area Congress intended to 
leave free of state regulation and thereby is preempted under the 
Machinist doctrine.247 
C. Section 211-a is Not Precluded from NLRA Preemption by 
the Market Participant Exception 
In applying the two factors of the Cardinal Towing test, it is 
evident that the market 
participant exception is inapplicable to Section 211-a because 
New York State is acting as a regulator rather than a proprietor or 
market participant. First, despite the proprietary purpose 
articulated in the statute, New York State is not acting as a 
proprietor by concerning itself with employers’ use of state funds 
subsequent to the provision of services and by restricting 
employers’ spending of their own money.248 The State is also 
regulating labor relations by discouraging employers from voicing 
their views on unionization during an organizing campaign.249 
Second, Section 211-a is regulatory in nature because it involves 
broader policy setting through its application to all state 
contracts.250 Hence, Section 211-a is not saved from NLRA 
preemption. 
In addressing the first issue under Cardinal Towing, whether 
Section 211-a reflects New York State’s interest in its efficient 
procurement of needed goods and services, the New York district 
court in Legal Aid Society v. City of New York articulated that the 
objective effects, rather than the subjective motivations, of the 
challenged state action ought to be gauged by determining 
“whether the action functions to promote a particular labor policy 
in general or else to serve legitimate proprietary needs within a 
more discrete setting.”251 Furthermore, in Aeroground, Inc. v. City 
and County of San Francisco the district court held that the air 
                                                          
247 HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 23. 
248 Appellees’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 46, at 22-23, 27. 
249 HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 20. 
250 Id. at 17. 
251 Legal Aid Society v. City of New York, 114 F. Supp. 2d 204, 237 
(N.D.N.Y. 2000). 
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commission’s declaration that the purpose of its card check rule 
was a proprietary interest in the revenues resulting from the 
efficient operation of the airport, could not defeat the actual 
application of the rule.252 Therefore, while the legislature 
articulated that the purpose of Section 211-a was to ensure that 
scarce public resources were used solely for their intended 
purposes (i.e., to benefit the public), which it deems is proprietary 
in nature, the subjective motivations of the State are irrelevant; 
rather, the objective effects of the statute are to be considered.253 
Even if we were to consider the subjective motivations, the 
legislative history provides ample reason to believe that Section 
211-a was not enacted for financial reasons alone. While the State 
insists that the purpose of the legislation is to safeguard public 
money and not to lower barriers to union organization, business 
employers who oppose New York’s union neutrality law have 
cited speeches by labor officials and their political allies’ 
legislation as evidence that the law’s actual purpose is to enhance 
unionization, not to protect the integrity of public money.254 The 
Bill that served as the basis for the enactment of the Section even 
declares that the purpose of the legislation was to prohibit state 
funds from being utilized to finance activities contrary to the right 
of employees to organize and to engage in collective bargaining.255 
Section 211-a is also not automatically characterized as 
proprietary merely because it addresses the financial interests of a 
public entity256 or because it involves a state’s spending power.257 
In Aeroground, the court held that while the commission may have 
intended the rule to be for a strictly financial purpose, “simply 
addressing the financial interests of a public entity does not make 
                                                          
252 Aeroground, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 170 F. Supp. 2d 
950, 958 (D. Cal. 2001). 
253 HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 19 (citing N.Y. LAB. LAW § 211-a(1)). 
254 Logan, supra note 48, at 190. 
255 Assemb. 8058, 219 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1996). 
256 ANOTHER LOOK AT THE PROPRIETARY/REGULATORY DICHOTOMY, 
supra note 165. 
257 Wis. Dep’t. of Indus., Labor and Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 
U.S. 282, 287 (1986) (holding that there is no validity to the distinction between 
a state’s regulatory power and a state’s spending power). 
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such efforts those of a market participant.”258 New York State is 
not acting in a proprietary role because particularly in the Medicaid 
context Section 211-a places restrictions on the use of state funds 
once a contract has already been awarded, as opposed to setting 
prices for services.259 It is unlikely that private parties would be 
concerned with the recipient’s use of its payments for goods and 
services that have already been provided.260 Section 211-a 
regulates employers’ spending of their own money because 
Medicaid reimbursement for services previously rendered is the 
facility’s money, and hence the state does not have a proprietary 
interest in the funds.261 In addition, since a large portion of these 
Medicaid payments derive from federal and local sources, the state 
has no proprietary interest over these funds when they merely pass 
through the state treasury for administration to employers.262 
In looking beyond Section 211-a’s recitation of a proprietary 
interest, it is evident that Section 211-a is a regulatory decision that 
alters national labor policy by seeking to stifle the employers’ 
exercise of free speech rights.263 Other states have addressed 
similar issues and have found the market participation exception 
inapplicable. For instance, in New England Health Care, 
Employees Union, District 1199 v. Rowland, the district court of 
Connecticut held that the state’s anticipatory subsidies and use of 
state resources during nursing-home strikes constituted regulatory 
actions that were focused on the broad policy-oriented interest of 
ensuring the health and safety of the public, and as such the state’s 
actions were not considered to be proprietary.264 According to the 
                                                          
258 Aeroground, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 958. 
259 Brief of Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of 
America in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 25, HANYS, No. 05-2750 (2d Cir. 
argued Feb. 10, 2006). See Michael Parker Aff. ¶ 36, HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d 6 
(N.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 03-0413) (explaining that the State reimburses for 
services already rendered by paying Medicaid providers after it has already 
received a service in the quality and quantity for which it had contracted). 
260 Appellees’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 46, at 27. 
261 Id. at 22-23. 
262 Id. at 26-27. 
263 Id. at 28. 
264 New England Health Care, Employees Union, District 1199 v. Rowland, 
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court, where the policy decisions constituted regulation that had a 
discernible impact on the bargaining relationship between labor 
and management, the market participant exception is not fitting.265 
Likewise, Section 211-a is a regulatory scheme that focuses on the 
state’s economic well-being, and has an impact on the labor-
management relationship.266 Despite its facially neutral language, 
the statute affects the policy of neutrality in labor relations by 
fostering one-sided debate in union organizing campaigns.267 The 
statute essentially permits unions to actively participate in union 
organization campaigns, while curtailing the ability of employers 
to voice their opposition to unions.268 
For the second Cardinal Towing factor, courts often look to the 
scope of the state’s conduct in deciding the application of the 
market participant exception.269 If a state’s activity is focused on 
one specific project, courts usually determine that the state is 
acting in a proprietary capacity.270 On the other hand, where the 
                                                          
221 F. Supp. 2d 297, 327 (D. Conn. 2002). 
265 Id. at 328. 
266 HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 19 (“Section 211-a ‘by its design sweeps 
broadly to shape policy in the overall labor market’ . . . [and is an] ‘important 
part of the state’s system for safeguarding the public fisc.’”) (quoting Lockyer I, 
364 F.3d at 1163); Brief of Brennan Center for Justice et. al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Defendants at 2, HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 03-
0413), available at 2003 WL 24152867. 
267 ANOTHER LOOK AT THE PROPRIETARY/REGULATORY DICHOTOMY, supra 
note 165 (citing HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 20). 
268 Id. 
269 Befort & Smith, supra note 8, at 117-18. 
270 Id. at 117. See also Cardinal Towing & Auto Repair, Inc. v. City of 
Bedford, Tex., 180 F.3d 686, 693 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a city was acting 
as a proprietor when it passed and enforced an ordinance involving contract 
provisions for bidders for the city’s towing services); Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. 
at 232 (holding that a state agency was acting as a proprietor when it contracted 
for the construction of sewage treatment and other facilities that it would own 
and manage); Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Mills, 283 F.3d 404, 420-21 (2d Cir. 
2002) (holding that the School District acted as a proprietor where it entered into 
a single lease agreement with respect to a single building that required the 
provider of wireless communication services to certify that it was in compliance 
with FCC regulations). But see Building and Construction Trades Department, 
AFL-CIO v. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (determining that an 
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state’s conduct is akin to policy setting, courts typically construe 
the state’s activity as regulation.271 In Boston Harbor, the Supreme 
Court held that a bid specification that was specifically tailored to 
one particular project did not constitute regulation.272 The New 
York district court in Van-Go Transport Co. v. New York Board of 
Education distinguished the case from Boston Harbor in holding 
that New York City Board of Education’s policy of refusing to 
conditionally certify replacement workers was regulatory because 
the policy extended beyond the contract in issue through its 
industry-wide effect of restricting the ability of contractors to hire 
strike replacement workers, which is an established federal right.273 
Likewise, the New York statute has a broad scope and encourages 
a general policy rather than narrowly seeking to address a specific 
proprietary problem.274 Section 211-a applies to all state contracts, 
regardless of the amount of funding.275 In this respect, Section 211-
a is even broader in scope than California’s Neutrality Statute, 
which was not implicated unless the state funds exceeded a 
specified monetary floor of $10,000.276 Hence, the market 
participant exception is not applicable to Section 211-a. 
V. PROHIBITING EMPLOYERS FROM USING STATE FUNDS FOR 
UNION-RELATED ACTIVITIES WILL HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON 
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN NEW YORK STATE 
Section 211-a is discernibly one-sided in favor of unions, and 
is effectively a measure 
                                                          
executive order constituted proprietary action even though the order constituted 
a blanket, across-the-bard rule that was uniformly applied to government 
contractors). Allbaugh, however, may be inconsistent with the holdings of other 
market participant cases. Befort & Smith, supra note 8, at 119. 
271 Befort & Smith, supra note 8, at 117 (citing Dillingham Const. N.A., 
Inc. v. County of Sonoma, 190 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the state 
acted as a regulator where it established an apprentice prevailing wage law that 
was not created for a particular project)). 
272 Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 232. 
273 Van-Go Transp., 53 F. Supp. 2d at 288. 
274 HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 17. 
275 Id. 
276 Id. at 18. 
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designed by New York State to use its purchasing power to 
impose neutrality on employers during union organizing 
campaigns,277 as evidenced by the statute’s history and impact. The 
law originated from the vigorous lobbying efforts of two politically 
influential unions—the Service Employees International Union and 
the AFL-CIO.278 While the unions pushed for Governor George 
Pataki to sign Section 211-a, employer groups were strongly 
opposed to the law.279 Section 211-a’s effects also favor unions, as 
demonstrated by Judge McCurn’s holding in HANYS that: “despite 
its facially neutral language, section 211-a effects the policy of 
neutrality in the labor arena. It does this by in essence allowing 
unions to actively participate in union organization campaigns, 
while at the same time significantly curtailing the ability of 
employers to voice their opposition to unions.”280 
The troublesome result of New York Labor Law Section 211-
a’s imposition of neutrality on employers is the significant 
disruption of the National Labor Relations Act’s recognized and 
purposeful balance of the employer’s speech rights against the 
union’s speech rights.281 The NLRA designates that the NLRB 
conduct a secret-ballot election to resolve disputes over union 
recognition.282 Inherent in that process is an opportunity for both 
unions and employers to convey their views on unionization to 
employees before the election is held.283 The NLRA has a policy of 
encouraging vigorous debate between labor and management, 
which is considered an important means toward ensuring that 
employees make informed decisions about union representation.284 
As a result of the balance of speech rights among labor and 
management in pre-election communications to employees, unions 
                                                          
277 NLRB Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 199, at 4. 
278 Appellees’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 46, at n.6 (citing U.S. Court 
Rejects California Labor Neutrality Law, ALBANY TIMES UNION, Sept. 27, 
2002, at B2). See also Loomis, supra note 131. 
279 See supra Part III.A. 
280 HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 20. 
281 See Lewis, supra note 7. 
282 See NLRB Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 199, at 20. 
283 Braid, supra note 17. 
284 Id. 
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historically won approximately 55% of the secret ballot elections 
conducted by the NLRB.285 When employer neutrality is imposed, 
however, there is a wide disparity in election results, with unions 
winning an appreciably greater number of elections.286 This result 
illustrates the disruptive effect of union neutrality laws in the area 
of labor management relations. Proponents of neutrality 
agreements and card check, however, maintain that these methods 
of union organizing are preferable to NLRB-supervised 
elections.287 The supporters stress that these agreements account 
for more new union members than NLRB election victories, 
largely due to the diminishment of employers’ anti-union speech or 
conduct during election campaigns.288 Critics of neutrality 
agreements and card check counter that employee free choice can 
only be realized through a vibrant election campaign supervised by 
the NLRB, in which both the employer and the union inform 
employees of their views on unionization.289 
The provision in Section 211-a specifically prohibiting the use 
of state funds to train supervisors or managers regarding methods 
to encourage or discourage unionization, or to hire or pay attorneys 
or consultants to encourage or discourage union organization 
impedes employers’ efforts to engage in the full range of activities 
and speech that the NLRA and NLRB permit during a union 
organizing campaign.290 In the wake of the aggressive agenda 
                                                          
285 Lewis, supra note 7. See also Barker, supra note 33, at 34 (noting that 
unions win secret ballot elections about half the time). 
286 Lewis, supra note 7 (noting a 1999 AFL-CIO study concluding that 
unions win 84% of elections when employers are bound by agreements 
containing one-sided neutrality provisions). See also Barker, supra note 33, at 
34 (stating that it has been estimated that as many as 90% of the instances in 
which a card-check or neutrality agreement is in place, the union has obtained 
the status of bargaining representative). 
287 James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: 
Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 22 (March 2005) 
(asserting that the NLRB election paradigm should be restructured or completely 
replaced by alternative approaches, such as card check and neutrality 
agreements). 
288 Id. at 830, 832. 
289 Id. at 841. 
290 Michael Parker Aff., supra note 259, at ¶ 14. 
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announced by the AFL-CIO and the Change to Win Coalition to 
revitalize the unions through lobbying and wide-scale organizing 
efforts, employers may require legal advice on the new tactics 
employed by the labor unions and the lawful responses 
management may provide to employees’ questions about unions, 
as well as advice in the development of a strategy to respond to an 
aggressive approach from the unions.291 Also, the NLRB has 
recognized the significance of unrestricted access to attorneys and 
well-trained managerial staff as a means of fostering its goal of 
prompt resolution of representation disputes.292 According to the 
NLRB, attorney advice may assist employers in bringing forward 
evidence of unfair labor practices of the petitioning union, in 
communicating to its employees in a lawful manner, and in 
promptly correcting any mistakes in expressing its views.293 
Supervisors and managers may also find it increasingly 
necessary to become educated about their rights to communicate 
with employees about the employer’s philosophy on unions.294 
Since supervisors have direct contact with employees, they are the 
most essential personnel in communications with the employees, 
and they are in the best position to make a determination as to 
critical issues the employer should address and information that 
needs to be clarified or emphasized.295 Therefore, by placing 
restrictions on state funding for advise, counseling, and training 
which are lawful under the current federal labor relations scheme, 
Section 211-a interferes with the NLRA’s policy for labor 
management relations. 
                                                          
291 Stief & Treacy, supra note 18. See Unions and Management 
Representatives Disagree on Extent of Consultants’ Influence, 75 DLR C-1, 
April 19, 1988 (providing an estimate by a management labor relations attorney 
that 99% of companies retain attorneys or management consultants when faced 
with a union organizing drive “because they don’t know how to react legally or 
practically.”). 
292 NLRB Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 199, at 25. 
293 Id. at 26 (citing NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270, 277 (1973); 
ITT Lighting Fixtures, Div. of ITT Corp. v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1983); 
Columbia Alaska Reg’l Hosp., 327 NLRB 876, 877 (1999)). 
294 Stief & Treacy, supra note 18. 
295 Frederick D. Braid Aff., supra note 213, at ¶ 21. 
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In addition to Section 211-a’s core spending provision 
prohibiting employers from using state funds to discourage or 
encourage unionization, the statute’s record-keeping and penalty 
provisions further have a chilling effect on employers’ ability to 
communicate their views to employees during an union election 
campaign. The President of the Healthcare Association of New 
York State, which was the main plaintiff in HANYS, expressed his 
frustrations with the state record-keeping requirements by asserting 
that healthcare providers were finding it impossible to separate 
state funds from federal monies expended to treat a Medicaid 
patient.296 If hospitals are thereby unable to comply with the 
record-keeping requirements, they are in violation of Section 211-a 
and can face harsh penalties.297 As a result, employers, especially 
nonprofit healthcare providers, may be intimidated into deciding 
not to oppose the union-organizing effort in order to avoid being 
charged with violating Section 211-a and then having to deal with 
the difficulties proving that they are not using state dollars on labor 
consultants.298 Section 211-a thus effectively prevents employers 
from exercising their free speech rights during a unionization 
campaign.299 An affirmation of the district court’s ruling in HANYS 
will guarantee that employers that are largely funded by the state 
government are able to provide their employees with factual 
information and freely communicate their views during a 
unionization campaign to the same extent as other employers, 
thereby allowing workers to hear both sides of the unionization 
debate and make an informed decision about whether they want 
union representation.300 
                                                          
296 Coalition Of Health Care Employers Urges Federal Government To Act 
Against State Employer Gag Law, HANYS (Jan. 7, 2003), 
http://www.hanys.org/communications/pr/010703pr.cfm. 
297 Id. 
298 Seanna Adcox, Pataki Signs Bill Barring Use of Public Funds to Fight 
Union Organizing Efforts, MENTAL HEALTH E-NEWS (Oct. 1, 2002), 
http://www.nyaprs.org/pages/view_enews.cfm?enewsid=2152. 
299 Coalition Of Health Care Employers Urges Federal Government To Act 
Against State Employer Gag Law, HANYS (Jan. 7, 2003), 
http://www.hanys.org/communications/pr/010703pr.cfm. 
300 D’Ambrosio, supra note 44. 
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Section 211-a’s chilling effect on speech is imposed even on 
employers who receive a significant portion of funding from 
private sources.301 An examination of California’s Neutrality 
Statute is particularly instructive with regard to Section 211-a.302 
The practical effect of California’s Neutrality Statute’s 
compliance, enforcement, and penalty provisions was to force 
employers who received grants from the State to remain neutral 
during union-organizing campaigns by placing significant 
restrictions on employers’ rights to spend money on otherwise 
legal, non-coercive means of communicating their views on 
unionization to employees.303 In California, unions used the 
Neutrality Statute’s enforcement provisions to obtain bargaining 
leverage in labor disputes, while the Statute’s intended purpose—
to provide recovery on claims for funds spent on union organizing 
activities in violation of the statute—fell to the wayside.304 
There exists a substantial record containing numerous instances 
where labor unions in California leveraged the significant 
compliance burdens of the Neutrality Statute as a means of 
enhancing their bargaining position against employers.305 After the 
enactment of California’s Neutrality Statute, unions in California 
sought to coerce employers into refraining from hiring consultants 
and attorneys, and from communicating their views about 
unionization to employees, by sending threatening complaints 
containing allegations of employer violations of the statute to the 
employers and the California Attorney General’s office, many of 
which provided no factual support.306 For example, one union 
allegation of a violation of the Neutrality Statute contained little 
factual support, and even contained an offer to settle the alleged 
violation if the employer agreed to enter into a neutrality 
                                                          
301 See Braid, supra note 17. 
302 Although the Lockyer II decision was withdrawn and the case is 
currently being reheard by the en banc court, the record for California’s 
Neutrality Statute was laid out by the 9th Circuit in Lockyer I. 
303 Greenberg Traurig, supra note 238. 
304 Id. 
305 Lockyer II, 422 F.3d at 980. 
306 Id. at 980-81. 
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agreement with the union.307 Several lawsuits were also filed 
against employers pursuant to the Neutrality Statute by 
California’s Attorney General and by the unions themselves.308 In 
one case, the Service Employees International Union, Local 399, 
which at the time of the suit was a member union of the AFL-CIO, 
alleged that a nursing home unlawfully used state funds to deter 
union organizing by its employees, as well as failed to maintain 
financial records sufficient to demonstrate that the funds were not 
used towards union organizing efforts.309 The Service Employees 
International Union furthermore pressed various employers who 
received funding from the California government to either permit 
unionization or otherwise face penalties under the Neutrality 
Statute,310 which demonstrates the pro-union impact of California’s 
law.311 
What occurred in California foreshadows the likely effects of 
Section 211-a should the law be permitted to remain in force. 
California’s Neutrality Statute and Section 211-a contain very 
similar provisions.312 Both laws mandate that employers must 
maintain financial records in order to demonstrate compliance.313 
Penalties imposed by the laws include rescission and civil penalties 
for those employers who commit knowing and repeated 
violations.314 One difference between the statutes is that 
California’s Neutrality Statute includes a state taxpayer suit 
provision, which provides for private enforcement of the statute.315 
While Section 211-a lacks such a provision, it permits the state 
attorney general to seek an order restraining the employer’s 
                                                          
307 Id. at 980. 
308 Id. at 981. 
309 Id. 
310 Id. 
311 Id. at 982. 
312 See HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 23 (noting that “section 211-a and the 
Lockyer statute are remarkably similar”). 
313 Id. at 24 (noting that the mandatory record keeping provisions in both 
statutes are similar). 
314 Id. 
315 Id. 
CHARISH MACROED CORRECTED 07-30-06.DOC 7/30/2006 12:35 PM 
830 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
commission of the alleged violation.316 If such state action occurs 
during a union organizing campaign, it may very well have the 
same disruptive effect as a taxpayer lawsuit.317 Moreover, when 
the Service Employees International Union brought suit against a 
nursing home in California, it premised a cause of action in its 
lawsuit that did not rely on California’s Neutrality Statute’s private 
enforcement provision.318 Rather, it alleged that the nursing 
home’s misuse of state funds gave the union a cause of action for 
injunctive relief and restitution on behalf of the State of 
California.319 Therefore, unions could potentially sue under New 
York State law to enforce Section 211-a’s restriction on the use of 
state funds.320 
In fact, in a few instances prior to the challenge to Section 211-
a brought in HANYS, the unions brought complaints to the 
Attorney General about alleged employer Section 211-a 
violations.321 For example, in response to a complaint brought by 
the Union of Needletrades Industrial and Textile Employees 
(UNITE) alleging Section 211-a violations, the New York State 
Comptroller informed an affiliate of United Cerebral Palsy 
Associations of New York State, (CPANY) one of the plaintiffs in 
HANYS, that it would be initiating an investigation of its use of 
both state and county funds during its organization campaign, 
without mentioning to CPANY the supposed illegal conduct.322 
Should the Second Circuit not find that Section 211-a is 
preempted, it is more than likely that these complaints will 
multiply as they did in California, inevitably inhibiting the ability 
of employers to engage in the election campaign.323 
                                                          
316 Id. (citing N.Y. LAB. LAW § 211-a(4)). 
317 Id. 
318 Lockyer II, 422 F.3d at 981. 
319 Id. 
320 Id. 
321 Appellees’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 46, at 56. 
322 Michael Parker Aff., supra note 259, at ¶ 16. The letter stated that the 
Comptroller received a report detailing allegations with respect to misuse of 
public funds. Letter from Leonard A. Mancusi, Special Assistant to the 
Comptroller, to Katie Meskell, Executive Director of CPANY, Oct. 10, 2003. 
323 Appellees’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 46, at 56. 
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Proposals for union neutrality legislation similar to those 
passed by California and New York have been introduced in the 
legislatures of numerous other states.324 However, should the Ninth 
Circuit agree with its vacated opinion in Chamber of Commerce of 
the United States v. Lockyer, which declared that the California 
Neutrality Statute was preempted under both the Machinist and the 
Garmon doctrines, this holding will likely signal an end to the 
trend of state legislation imposing employer neutrality during 
union organizing campaigns.325 An affirmation of HANYS would 
further signal to other states that legislation setting forth spending 
limitations that impede employers’ free speech rights during union 
organizing campaigns are preempted by the NLRA.326 An 
affirmation would also provide employers in New York receiving 
state funds with the freedom to communicate their views on 
unionization to employees in a non-coercive manner without fear 
of incurring substantial penalties, and the restoration of a level 
playing field in contested union organizing campaigns by fostering 
open debate.327 Furthermore, should the Second Circuit not affirm 
the HANYS decision, the likely resultant proliferation of state union 
neutrality laws differing in the restrictions they impose on labor 
activities would subject multi-state employers to differing rules as 
to their spending of state funds, the books and records they need to 
keep, and the penalties to which they would be subjected for 
violating the statutes.328 This development would frustrate 
Congress’ purpose in establishing a uniform national labor 
policy.329 
On the other side, should the Second Circuit decide to affirm 
HANYS, the unions may construe Section 211-a’s preemption as a 
crippling setback to their efforts to reverse the declining trend in 
                                                          
324 Lockyer II, 422 F.3d at 981. 
325 Greenberg Traurig, supra note 238. See also Lewis, supra note 7. 
326 Id. 
327 Braid, supra note 17. 
328 Appellees’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 46, at 42. See also NLRB 
Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 199, at 22 (noting that Board elections would 
be conducted differently in states having union neutrality agreements from those 
who do not). 
329 Id. at 43. 
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union membership. The unions have insisted that the utilization of 
labor consultants and labor attorneys by employers during 
organizing campaigns has constituted a significant reason for the 
decline in union membership and the decrease in union success 
rates in NLRB elections.330 Union advocates maintain that the 
NLRA’s ideological underpinnings are to favor and promote union 
organization, yet employers focus on the NLRA’s protection of 
informed employee choice with regard to whether they desire 
union representation.331 The latter value is inherent in the system 
of labor relations imposed by the NLRA, and resultantly allows for 
free debate and the active opposition of American employers to 
union organizing efforts as a means of ensuring that employees are 
not receiving one-sided, biased information on unionization.332 
Some commentators point to the NLRA’s facilitation of employer 
opposition, through its use of representation elections as the 
preferred method of determining union majority status, as a 
contributing factor to the steep decline of unionization in the 
United States.333 Employers are therefore permitted under the 
NLRA to wage an anti-union campaign with the only proviso 
being that threats, coercion, or promise of benefits are 
impermissible.334 Unions claim, however, that employers abuse 
                                                          
330 Unions and Management Representatives Disagree on Extent of 
Consultants’ Influence, 75 DLR C-1, April 19, 1988. The unions consider 
seminars offered by consultants on such topics as union decertification to be 
union busting techniques, and have asserted that labor lawyers are becoming 
more involved in union prevention tactics. Id. However, this explanation for the 
union decline has been refuted by employers, attorneys, and consultants who 
contend that the decline in union membership is due to a myriad of other 
significant factors. Id. 
331 Peter M. Panken, supra note 26, at 425. 
332 Befort, supra note 17, at 371 (stating that the active opposition of 
employers to union organizing efforts is a unique attribute of the American 
system of labor relations). 
333 Id. at 371-72 (noting that the NLRA’s electoral model differs from other 
industrialized countries. Whereas such countries employ a system in which 
employers must automatically bargain with a union, in the United States an 
employer is not obligated to bargain with a union until it demonstrates majority 
status in a representation election. Id.) 
334 Id. (referring to the provisions in NLRA section 8(c)). 
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this system by engaging in unlawful conduct and delaying and 
obstructing organizing drives.335 Studies on whether employers’ 
anti-union tactics in fact influence election outcomes is 
conflicting,336 and Arthur Rosenfeld, Acting General Counsel of 
the NLRB, has maintained that the decline in union membership is 
not necessarily due to unfair tactics by employers.337 
Despite the conflicting views of the effects of the NLRA’s 
procedures for union organizing, under national labor policy as it 
presently exists, both the unions and employers have the freedom 
to voice their opinions regarding union representation in a non-
coercive manner and employees have the freedom to become 
informed about both the advantages and disadvantages of 
unionization.338 The liberty to campaign in the workplace may be 
validly waived by either the union or employer, but solely in 
instances where the waiver constitutes a voluntary choice resulting 
from bargaining.339 Section 211-a is therefore at odds with federal 
labor policy as it currently exists.340 Should the unions believe that 
union neutrality laws are an effective and important mechanism for 
bolstering union membership, they ought to lobby Congress to 
amend the NLRA directly or to write exemptions into other 
laws.341 
                                                          
335 Fred O. Williams, NLRB Wants State’s ‘Union Neutrality’ Law Struck 
Down, BUFFALO NEWS (May 10, 2003) at C-1. 
336 Befort, supra note 17, at 372 (citing conflicting empirical studies). See 
Paul C. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-
Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983), in SAMUEL 
ESTREICHER & STEWART J. SCHWAB, FOUNDATIONS OF LABOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 105-11 (Foundation Press 2000) (contending that the decline 
in union success in representation elections is largely due to deficiencies in the 
NLRA, namely that it does not eliminate coercive antiunion employer tactics). 
337 Williams, supra note 335. 
338 NLRB Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 199, at 19. 
339 Id. at 20 (citing Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 
U.S. 608, 619 (1986). 
340 See NLRB Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 199, at 30 (stating that 
Section 211-a essentially rewrites the NLRA). 
341 See id. (noting that Congress alone has the authority to revise the 
NLRA). In fact, amendments to the NLRA which would alter the Board’s 
representation process were proposed in 1977 and 1978, but were subsequently 
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CONCLUSION 
Section 211-a directly interferes with the NLRA’s policy of 
open debate as a method of providing employees with information 
in union representation elections.342 The law effectively deprives 
employees of their employer’s viewpoint when they are 
considering unionization.343 The law thereby imposes a bias 
toward unionization by leaving union organizers free to 
communicate to employees the advantages of unions, while 
employers’ free speech rights to provide the opposing viewpoint 
are diminished.344 Since this regulation is an impermissible 
interference with federal regulation of labor management activities, 
Section 211-a is fully preempted by the NLRA.345 
The determination made by the Second Circuit in its 
consideration of the State’s appeal 
from the district court’s holding in HANYS is likely to have a 
pronounced effect on labor relations in New York State. If the 
Second Circuit upholds the district court’s decision, employers will 
be free to use state funding to either encourage or discourage union 
organizing activities. Employers contend that this freedom will 
restore the balance between labor and management by allowing 
employees contemplating joining a union to hear both sides of the 
unionization debate.346 Since organized labor in New York viewed 
the law as a means toward curbing the problem of public subsidy 
of anti-union campaigns,347 they will have to look to methods other 
than neutrality laws to achieve this goal.348 
                                                          
rejected by Congress. Id. at 4. More recently, the Employee Free Choice Act, 
H.R. 1696, 108th Cong. (2005) has been introduced to Congress, and seeks to 
advocate neutrality and card-check processes that would essentially eliminate 
the traditional process of government conducted secret-ballot elections. 
342 See Appellees’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 46, at 37. 
343 Braid, supra note 17. 
344 Id. 
345 Id. 
346 Caher, supra note 141. 
347 Logan, supra note 48, at 187. 
348 Id. Other methods can include responsible contractor legislation or 
legislation expanding collective bargaining coverage, which do not raise 
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The State laments the district court’s decision as an affront to 
its discretion in placing restrictions on the spending of state 
funds.349 However, the mere fact that the State is using its spending 
power is insufficient to save Section 211-a’s interference with the 
NLRA and its subsequent preemption, because Congress would 
not have intended to permit a state to overtake the NLRA’s federal 
scheme of law, remedy, and administration simply because the 
state was using its spending power.350 As recognized by the district 
court in HANYS, while 
ensuring ‘essential state-funded services for the most 
vulnerable New Yorkers’ is a laudable goal . . . ‘the State 
must take care that, in its zeal to act, it does not do so 
unnecessarily and outside the permissible bounds of its 
discretion and thereby tread on the federally protected zone 
of labor rights.’351 
 
 
                                                          
preemption or constitutional issues, and may prove more effective at 
circumventing aggressive anti-union campaigns. Id. at 189. 
349 Caher, supra note 141. 
350 See NLRB Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 199, at 5. 
351 HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 25 (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae Brennan 
Center for Justice, etc. at 1, HANYS, 388 F. Supp. 2d 6 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 
03-0413); New England Health Care, Employees Union, District 1199 v. 
Rowland, 221 F. Supp. 2d 297, 345 (D. Conn. 2002)). 
